Conceptual Systems Security Analysis Aerial Refueling Case Study by Span, Martin Trae, III
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-22-2018
Conceptual Systems Security Analysis Aerial
Refueling Case Study
Martin Trae Span III
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Systems and Communications Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Span, Martin Trae III, "Conceptual Systems Security Analysis Aerial Refueling Case Study" (2018). Theses and Dissertations. 1904.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1904
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS SECURITY ANALYSIS AERIAL REFUELING 
 CASE STUDY 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
Martin “Trae” Span III, Captain, USAF 
 
AFIT-ENV-MS-18-M-237 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.  
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United 
States Government. This material is declared a work of the U. S. Government and is not 
subject to copyright protection in the United States. 
 
AFIT-ENV-MS-18-M-237 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS SECURITY ANALYSIS AERIAL REFUELING 
 CASE STUDY 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Presented to the Faculty 
Department of Systems Engineering and Management 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Air University 
Air Education and Training Command 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Science in Systems Engineering 
 
 
Martin “Trae” Span III, BS 
Captain, USAF 
 
March 2018 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.  
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.  
 
AFIT-ENV-MS-18-M-237 
 
CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS SECURITY ANALYSIS AERIAL REFUELING 
 CASE STUDY 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
Martin “Trae” Span III, BS 
Captain, USAF 
 
Committee Membership: 
 
Lt. Col Logan O. Mailloux, PhD 
Chair 
 
Dr. Robert F. Mills, PhD 
Member 
 
Col William Young, PhD 
Member 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
AFIT-ENV-MS-18-M-237 
 
Abstract 
In today’s highly interconnected and technology reliant environment, systems 
security is rapidly growing in importance to complex systems such as automobiles, 
airplanes, and defense-oriented weapon systems. While systems security analysis 
approaches are critical to improving the security of these advanced cyber-physical 
systems-of-systems, such approaches are often poorly understood and applied in ad hoc 
fashion. To address these gaps, first a study of key architectural analysis concepts and 
definitions is provided with an assessment of their applicability towards complex cyber-
physical systems. From this initial work, a definition of cybersecurity architectural 
analysis for cyber-physical systems is proposed. Next, the System Theory Theoretic 
Process Analysis approach for Security (STPA-Sec) is tailored and presented in three 
phases which support the development of conceptual-level security requirements, 
applicable design-level criteria, and architectural-level security specifications in 
alignment with the systems engineering standard ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and the newly 
released NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security Engineering publication. 
This work uniquely presents a detailed case study of a conceptual-level systems 
security analysis of a notional aerial refueling system based on the tailored STPA-Sec 
approach. This case study provides a detailed security analysis with emphasis on how to 
conduct STPA-Sec early in the development process to more accurately elicit, 
understand, and define security requirements in three levels of increasing detail: 1. Initial 
security requirements are systematically elicited; 2. Design for security requirements are 
v 
identified; and 3. Build-to security specifications are formally defined. This work is 
critically important for advancing the science of systems security engineering by 
providing a standardized approach for understanding security, safety, and resiliency 
requirements in complex systems with traceability and testability. 
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CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS SECURITY ANALYSIS AERIAL REFUELING 
 CASE STUDY 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
General Issue 
 In today’s highly interconnected and technology reliant environment, systems 
security is rapidly growing in importance. As the Internet of Things continues to grow, 
the centrality of cyber-physical devices to modern life is increasingly important. Thus, 
security (and safety) is now an emergent property of cyber-physical systems, where their 
software and real-time networks require continuous interaction [1].  For example, the 
2017 Ford F-150, a fairly common vehicle, has over 150 million lines of code distributed 
across dozens of computing devices with software providing essential functionality [2], 
[3]. Moreover, intelligent adversaries are challenging traditional assumptions that cyber-
physical systems are secure due to their relative isolation and uniqueness with recent 
examples including the widely publicized hacking demonstration against a Jeep Cherokee 
[4], claims of hacking a commercial airliner [5], and comprehensive reports of vehicular 
attack paths [6].  
In light of these growing threats, the United States Department of Defense (U. S. 
DoD) has made recent changes to expand traditional IT-focused security approaches and 
mandate security assessments for major weapon systems (MWS) [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], 
[12]. These policies dictate that acquisition programs integrate security efforts into 
existing systems engineering processes, and work to ensure security considerations hold 
equal footing with other requirements and design trade-offs at major program reviews. 
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Although, these DoD mandates are in place, a well-received streamlined executable 
approach for MWS cybersecurity analysis is yet to be defined. This research explores 
these problems and presents a case study of interest to the USAF.  
Problem Statement 
While systems security analysis approaches are critical to improving the security 
of complex systems-of-systems, such approaches are often poorly understood and applied 
in ad hoc fashion.  Across the defense industry, the DoD, and the Air Force program 
offices have differing approaches to this problem. Most of the system security approaches 
surveyed are focused on realized systems with limited solution space as they begin 
analysis at the physical system solution where the cost to design for security and 
resiliency is greatly increased. Moreover, the lack of measurable and verifiable security 
and resiliency requirements in early, pre physical form, system design has plagued the 
development of complex weapons systems often leaving mission owners with little 
choice between restricted functionality and expensive bolt on security features, often at 
the detriment of mission effectiveness.  
Research Context 
Emphasizing the importance of this problem, the US Congress included a 
mandate and provided significant funding in the National Defense Authorization Act of 
2016 Section 1647 [8] to assess all of major weapons systems across all services for 
cyber vulnerabilities. In response, the Air Force stood up the Cyber Resiliency Office for 
Weapons Systems (CROWS) to develop and execute the Air Force Cyber Campaign 
Plan’s (CCP) two overall goals: ‘Bake In’ cyber resiliency to new weapons systems, and, 
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in line with the congressional mandate, mitigate ‘critical’ vulnerabilities in fielded 
systems [13]. The CROWS office has emphasized the importance of integrating cyber 
into systems engineering through training of a cyber savvy acquisition force.  
Cybersecurity for weapons systems in no longer a task just for the IT professional, but 
should be integrated in systems engineering efforts. It must be specified in early 
requirements to be included in the design trades with all other mission needs. In light of 
the growing cybersecurity threat, a clear necessity has emerged for a streamlined 
executable early systems based approach.  
This work directly contributes to the CROWS and CCP Line of Action 3‘Train 
Cyber Workforce’ by providing a case study example of a conceptual security analysis to 
elicit security requirements for future major weapons systems.   
Investigative Questions 
1. What is Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis? 
2. What methods exist for conducting Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis? 
3. What are the key characteristics for Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis and how 
do they map to current approaches for complex cyber-physical systems? 
4. How can STPA-Sec be tailored to enable the development of security 
requirements and design criteria? 
5. How executable is STPA-Sec for USAF warfighting Systems? 
6. What recommendations can be made to increase the utility and ease the use of 
STPA-Sec? 
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Methodology 
This research effort is conducted in two parts: First, this work surveys multiple 
approaches used to perform complex system security analysis (i. e. , cybersecurity 
architectural analysis) with specific focus to those relevant to the DoD and complex 
weapon systems. This research informs tailored definitions and desirable characteristics 
for conducting systems security. From this survey, STPA-Sec was chosen for further 
study and experimentation.  
Second, we conduct a case study offering a complete and thorough example of 
STPA-Sec on a notional next generation aerial refueling platform.   STPA-Sec is a 
promising approach for performing conceptual systems security analysis based on a 
methodology of systems theory dating back to Leveson’s original systems safety STAMP 
work which has been well received within the safety, aeronautical, and systems 
engineering communities [14], [15]. STPA-Sec is an extension of her methodology to the 
security domain and has been shown to effectively address security issues in complex 
cyber-physical systems [16]. This case study evaluates STPA-Sec’s utility to perform 
conceptual systems security analysis for United States Department of Defense Major 
Weapon Systems.  
Assumptions/Limitations/Scope 
To maximize the audience of this document, this thesis excludes sensitive or 
classified sources and information. The scope of this research effort is limited to system 
security approaches with publically available and citable documentation to enable the 
broadest distribution. Conclusions drawn on the effectiveness of the surveyed methods 
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are limited to SME inputs and author discretion as completion of a case study with each 
approach for direct comparison is beyond the scope of this research effort and would in 
fact take years to complete with little value. Mission specific details have been 
obfuscated and generalized for widest distribution.  
The Way Ahead 
 With the progressive nature of the research questions, this thesis will follow a 
scholarly, or k-paper, format. In Chapter II, the publication “Cybersecurity Architectural 
Analysis for Complex Cyber-Physical Systems” provides an extended background and 
literature review for this thesis. Of note, the work details key terms for systems security 
and surveys several architectural analysis approaches from government and industry.  
Moreover, it suggests a working definition of Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis, and 
identifies desirable characteristics for effective architectural analysis.  
In Chapter III, the publication “A Systems Security Analysis Approach for 
Understanding, Defining, and Specifying Security Requirements for Complex Cyber-
Physical Systems” introduces a tailored approach for STPA-Sec, a promising 
methodology for conceptual systems security analysis. In addition, an abbreviated case 
study for a space vehicle is presented to provide insight into the processes and benefits of 
an STPA-Sec analysis.   
 In Chapter IV, the journal publication “Conceptual Systems Security Analysis 
with Aerial Refueling Case Study” provides a detailed overview of the methodology and 
data used for the case study portion of this thesis. A tailored approach of STPA-Sec is 
presented building upon the foundation from Chapter III and expanded with additional 
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insight and recommendations for execution of STPA-Sec for a complex cyber-physical 
system. This is presented as a case study for a next generation aerial refueling platform.  
 Chapter V summarizes research questions with an emphasis on impact to the 
DoD, presents conclusions, and identifies future work.  
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Abstract—In the modern military’s highly interconnected and 
technology-reliant operational environment, cybersecurity is 
rapidly growing in importance. Moreover, cybersecurity is no 
longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks, 
as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against 
complex cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and 
airplanes. While architectural analysis approaches are critical to 
improving cybersecurity, these approaches are often poorly 
understood and applied in ad hoc fashion. This work addresses 
these gaps by answering the questions: 1. “What is cybersecurity 
architectural analysis?” and 2. “How can architectural analysis 
be used to more effectively support cybersecurity decision making 
for complex cyber-physical systems?” First, a readily 
understandable description of key architectural concepts and 
definitions is provided which culminates in a working definition 
of “cybersecurity architectural analysis,” since none is available 
in the literature. Next, we survey several architectural analysis 
approaches to provide the reader of an understanding of the 
various approaches being used across government and industry. 
Based our proposed definition, the previously introduced key 
concepts, and our survey results, we establish desirable 
characteristics for evaluating cybersecurity architectural analysis 
approaches. Lastly, each of the surveyed approaches is assessed 
against the characteristics and areas of future work are identified. 
Keywords—cybersecurity; architectural analysis; system 
architecture; systems security engineering; complex system security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The cybersecurity threat is one of the most serious economic 
and national challenges we face as a nation – economic 
prosperity in the 21st century depends on cyber [1]. Cyber 
attacks have grown in frequency and complexity, and it is now 
commonplace to hear of widespread cyber attacks on personal 
computers, webservers, and even large company and 
government personnel databases [2]. Moreover, as the Internet 
of Things (IoT) continues to grow, the centrality of cyber-
physical devices to modern life is increasingly important [3]. 
Previously, cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and 
airplanes were relatively simplistic. Astonishingly, the 2017 
Ford F-150, a relatively common vehicle, has over 150 million 
lines of code [4], demonstrating the complexity of modern 
systems when software is at the core of functionality [5]. For 
these cyber-enabled systems, adversaries are challenging 
traditional assumptions that systems are secure due to their 
relative isolation and uniqueness. Recent examples include a 
widely publicized hacking demonstration against a Jeep 
Cherokee [6], claims of hacking a commercial airliner [7], and 
comprehensive reports of vehicle vulnerabilities [8]. In light of 
this growing threat, it is critical to analyze modern weapon 
systems for cybersecurity vulnerabilities as directed by United 
States Congress [9].  
Recent United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DoD) 
policy updates have expanded the traditional IT security 
approaches and mandated cybersecurity assessments for cyber-
enabled weapon systems [9], [10], [11], [12]. These revisions 
dictate that acquisition programs integrate cybersecurity efforts 
into existing systems engineering processes, and work to ensure 
cyber considerations hold equal footing with other requirements 
and design trade-offs at major acquisition milestones [13].  
For highly complex systems, including U.S. DoD weapon 
systems, architectural analysis is a critical enabler to effective 
cybersecurity; however, architectural analysis approaches are 
often poorly understood and applied in ad hoc fashion. This 
work addresses these gaps by answering the questions: 
1. “What is cybersecurity architectural analysis?” 
2. “How can architectural analysis be used to more 
effectively support cybersecurity decision making for 
cyber-physical systems?” 
This paper examines and proposes answers to the above 
questions. In Section II, we provide a readily understandable 
discussion of key concepts and definitions. Section III expands 
on this foundation and surveys several cybersecurity 
architecture analysis approaches from government and industry. 
In Section IV, desirable characteristics for architectural analysis 
for cybersecurity are identified and mapped to the approaches 
from Section III. Lastly, Section V summarizes key findings 
and identifies promising follow-on research areas for increasing 
the effectiveness of cybersecurity architectural analysis of 
unprecedented systems, specifically modern complex 
cyber-physical systems. 
II. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
This section provides a brief historical context for system-
level architectural analysis and, more formally, discusses key 
definitions for cybersecurity architectural analysis. 
A. Brief History of System Architecture 
Much of the seminal work in the field of architecture 
analysis was accomplished by Zachman, who proposed the first 
system architecture—a logical construct for integrating the 
complexities of modern information systems [14]. Similarly to 
the varying levels of abstraction in physical construction plans, 
Zachman argued that system architectures should be composed 
of many perspectives in varying levels of detail. Moreover, he 
insisted that these perspectives (or views) be synchronized 
across the system, forming one integrated architecture. 
Sowa expanded Zachman’s work to form the Information 
Systems Architecture (ISA) framework [15]. Shown in Fig. 1, 
the ISA employs six interrogatives (what, how, where, who, 
when, and why) across five levels of detail (scope, business, 
system, technology, and detailed representations) as a means of 
expressing relationships to guide complex system development 
[16]. In this way, the ISA offers a simplified approach to 
compare and elaborate on the desired capabilities, requirements, 
components, and functions in an integrated enterprise-level 
model which enables effective decision making. Note, not all 
30 conceptual graphs are required; thus, the ISA is also 
tailorable. Since its inception, the ISA (commonly known as the 
Zachman Framework) has been a popular choice for system 
architects—it has been widely used by system architects for 
decades, while several other system-level frameworks have 
incorporated or adopted its tenets [17]. 
B. Key Definitions 
Here we discuss definitions for key terminology used in this 
work (i.e., “cybersecurity,” “architecture,” and “analysis”). 
First, the term “cybersecurity” should be addressed because it is 
generally the most poorly understood (see sidebar in [18]). 
Within the U.S. DoD, cybersecurity is formally defined as: 
The prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration 
of electronic systems to ensure its availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation [19]. 
Despite being often cited, this definition tends to cause 
confusion because it is packed with domain-specific IT jargon:  
availability ensures the system is usable as anticipated; integrity 
is the protection from unauthorized modification; 
confidentiality is keeping data private; authentication is a 
validation of the claimed identity; and nonrepudiation is the 
ability to prove that an action has taken place. While seemingly 
comprehensive, the U.S. DoD definition is somewhat hindered 
with legacy terminology; a more practical (i.e., a working) 
definition of cybersecurity might simply seek to protect critical 
systems against cyber-based threats [20]. 
The next key term to define is “architecture” (note, we 
interpret “architecture” synonymously with “system 
architecture” and/or “system-level architecture”). Perhaps the 
most classically understood definition of architecture is 
provided by Maier and Rechtin: 
Structure in terms of components, connections, and 
constraints of a product, process, or element [21].  
This definition offers a holistic view of the system of interest to 
include technological aspects as well as non-technological 
aspects, such as processes. In the simplest terms, an architecture 
merely provides a means for viewing the system of interest 
from different perspectives. Conversely, in a somewhat 
physically-driven characterization, ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 
provides the following definition for architecture: 
The fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its 
components, their relationship to each other and to the 
environment, and the principles governing its design and 
evolution [22]. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the U.S. DoD provides a very 
progressive definition of system architecture: 
A set of abstractions (or models) that simplify and 
communicate complex structures, processes, rules, and 
constraints to improve understanding and implementation 
[23]. 
In addition to being readily understandable, this definition alerts 
the reader to the intrinsic value offered by such architectures in 
that they serve to simplify communication with, and improve 
understanding of, key stakeholders (not just engineers). 
Moreover, this definition implies that architectures are intended 
to improve the system’s implementation. While these value-rich 
aspects of the definition are a bit atypical, they are useful for 
helping others to understand what an architecture is and does. 
 
Fig 1. The Zachman Framework for Enterprise Architecture [24]. 
 Lastly, the task of identifying a formal definition of 
“analysis” within the context of a “system architecture” proved 
more difficult than previous definitions. Often a systems 
architecture will center on an integrated model of entities and 
the relationships between them; architectural models serve as a 
vehicle to bring order, and thus understandability, to the 
growing complexity associated with complex systems. An 
architecture-focused definition may read as such 
Architectural analysis is the activity of discovering 
important system properties using conceptual and physical 
models of the system of interest [25].  
However, an architecture’s purpose is to increase understanding 
and facilitate better engineering choices [17]. This two-fold 
purpose is acutely stated by Crawley et al.: 
Architectural analysis focuses on understanding both the 
architecture’s function and form for the purpose of 
supporting decision making [26]. 
It is worth noting the closely related concept of architecture 
trade-off analysis, which focuses on evaluating and comparing 
alternative architecture-level designs and attributes (e.g., 
modifiability, security, performance, reliability, etc.) [27].  
C. Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Working Definition 
Ultimately, architectural analysis identifies trade-off points 
among system attributes and facilitates communication among 
stakeholders (e.g., customers, developers, operators, 
maintainers). System-level architectural analysis requires 
consideration of various missions, essential functions, potential 
components, and desirable attributes, which help to clarify and 
refine stakeholder needs and, later, requirements. Moreover, 
integrated architectural analysis provides a robust framework 
for ongoing and concurrent system design and analysis. 
Specific to the cyber domain, architectural analysis should 
be used to understand cyber dependencies within the functions 
and form of the system to enable well-informed decisions. This 
type of structured analysis brings an otherwise unmanageable 
amount of information under control in support of system 
security requirements [28]. Architectural analysis enables 
system-level programmatic risk management by providing 
context and functional mapping to the various physical 
elements of the system. Thus, cybersecurity architectural 
analysis allows appropriate security mitigations to be applied 
where needed with rigorous justification.  
After considering seminal definitions in the area, and 
working through the various architectural analysis approaches 
discussed in Section III, we present a working definition of 
cybersecurity architectural analysis for consideration:  
The activity of discovering and evaluating the function and 
form of a system to facilitate cybersecurity decisions. 
This definition identifies two key activities, discovery and 
evaluation, while simultaneously catering to both new 
development (i.e., a focus on desired capability through 
functionality) and legacy systems (i.e., a focus on existing 
system solutions). For new developments, discovery typically 
implies exploring the business or mission problem space to 
further understand the desired capability through functional 
analysis. For existing systems, this process is often conducted 
in the reverse, mapping critical subsystems back to critical 
functions which support important business operations or 
mission execution. It is also worth noting that cybersecurity 
architectural analysis should also help with identifying and 
understanding how security requirements support the desired 
capability, which also provides traceability that is often lacking 
in systems security efforts. 
As part of the broader system definition and development 
effort, cybersecurity architectural analysis should help inform 
engineering tradeoffs and decision making such as those 
processes and activities described in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288. 
III. CURRENT CYBERSECURITY                                    
ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS APPROACHES 
In this section, we survey architectural analysis approaches 
and assess their applicability for complex system cybersecurity. 
Within the U.S. DoD (and its major defense contractors), 
several approaches (i.e., methods, processes, and tools) have 
been developed to secure and assess the cybersecurity of 
complex systems and systems-of-systems. While providing a 
detailed case study for each approach surveyed in this work 
would be ideal for a robust assessment, it is simply not feasible 
as some approaches take months if not years to complete. This 
survey is based on publicly available literature and 
presentations that focus specifically on architectural analysis for 
weapon systems.  
The predecessor for many cybersecurity architectural 
analysis approaches is compliance-based Information 
Assurance (IA), which focuses almost exclusively on applying 
security controls to computer networks and IT systems. For 
complex systems this approach is inadequate as demonstrated 
by several high profile security breaches [29].  This inadequacy 
has driven the development of many of the approaches 
described in this work. 
A. Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF) 
The integrated architecture currently in use by the U.S. DoD 
is the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF). Its purpose is to 
manage complexity to enable key decisions through organized 
information sharing [23]. However, in DoDAF, like many other 
architecture frameworks, security (or cybersecurity) is not 
specifically addressed [30]. James Richards, in his work Using 
the Department of Defense Architecture Framework to Develop 
Security Requirements [28], proposes a methodology for using 
DoDAF to derive security requirements. He outlines a process 
of first building an architectural model of the enterprise, 
focusing on a core set of views including the OV-5b operational 
activity model, the DIV-2 logical data model, and the OV-3 
operational resource flow matrix. These critical views are used 
to model security-relevant processes, data, business rules, and 
communications. Next, he suggests comparing views for 
compliance and then assessing and refining the architecture. 
The overall purpose of Richards’ approach is to use DoDAF to 
expose or derive security requirements [28].  This approach has 
not been widely adopted but his work demonstrates utility for 
complex cyber-physical systems. 
B. Unified Architecture Framework (UAF)  
In contrast to the U.S. DoD unique solution DoDAF, 
industry has developed the Unified Architecture Framework 
(UAF) [31]. Based on industry need, the UAF includes a formal 
security domain amongst the more common architectural views. 
The UAF security domain includes views for security 
taxonomy, structure, connectivity, processes, constraints, and 
traceability. More specifically, it uses SysML class diagrams to 
identify data types and map them to protections and security 
controls. As an integrated architecture, it allows security-
relevant elements to be mapped to system resources and 
operations. UAF also capitalizes on the success of MBSE 
efforts to depict and analyze the security properties of a SoI via 
an executable architecture. Note, UAF is in the final stages of 
development, so its utility has yet to be fully realized; however, 
the some pathfinder examples of proposed security views 
demonstrate utility for conducting cybersecurity architectural 
analysis of complex cyber-physical systems [32]. 
C. Publically Avilable Industry Efforts 
Major defense contractors often use custom architectural 
analysis approaches to design and evaluate their system 
architectures with respect to cybersecurity. Although it is likely 
that most large U.S. DoD contractors are working solutions in 
this area; at the time of this survey, the authors were only 
exposed to efforts from Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and 
Lockheed Martin. Note, Raytheon’s Cyber Resiliency 
Architecture Framework (CRAF) was the only approach with a 
detailed open source publication available. Limited information 
is available on Northrop and Lockheed’s approaches. 
Raytheon developed CRAF using a DoDAF reference 
architecture with extensions for specific cyber resilience 
mappings and metrics [33]. The goal of CRAF is to assess and 
identify gaps in cyber resiliency by mapping systems, 
subsystems, and components against prioritized capabilities to 
identify resilience requirements for important mission 
scenarios.  
Using failure modes and effects analysis, Northrop 
Grumman created a risk-based assessment methodology using 
an integrated architecture modeled in the new UAF to identify 
cyber risks for their systems [32]. This approach is still under 
development and is one of the first systems security efforts 
based on the upcoming UAF standard security views from the 
Object Management Group (OMG). 
 Lockheed Martin has created a custom solution titled the 
Secure Engineering Assurance Model (SEAM) [34]. SEAM is a 
tailored systems security engineering approach to integrate 
security into every solution they deliver. This framework 
provides tailored security considerations and checklists for each 
program area. 
D. Risk Management Framework (RMF) for Cybersecurity 
In response to increasing risks against critical infrastructure 
and information technology systems, the US government 
enacted the Federal Information Security Management Act of 
2002 which established minimum information security 
requirements for federal information systems, and charged the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with 
developing security standards and guidelines to address these 
growing risks [35]. In response to this requirement, NIST 
created the Risk Management Framework (RMF) which 
provided a structured yet flexible process for applying these 
standards and guidelines [36]. Accordingly, RMF is the 
mandated approach for addressing cybersecurity in the U.S. 
DoD [11]. In general, this approach applies a prescriptive risk-
based methodology to cybersecurity with the goal of 
identifying, mitigating, and eliminating system vulnerabilities 
to protect systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction. Within the United 
States Air Force, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center 
is tasked with conducting RMF for legacy weapon systems 
(designated as the Platform IT (PIT) systems) [37]. This PIT 
assessment and authorization process consists of six steps 
described in the next paragraph [13]. 
First, the team must categorize the PIT system according to 
the information displayed, processed, stored, and transmitted 
along with the classification of the information and associated 
technologies. Second, security controls are selected (or 
assigned) based on the impact resulting from the loss of said 
information (i.e., criticality analysis) [12]. The third step is 
implementing said controls with consideration for cybersecurity 
requirements across the entire system development life cycle—
although security controls have been historically applied to IT 
systems, many have been tailored for PIT systems with 
prescribed overlays [37]. The fourth step is key to the RMF 
process and assesses the effectiveness of applied security 
controls through threat mapping and vulnerability analysis. On 
a related note, much of the security work conducted today is 
exclusively focused on this step. Based on the identified 
vulnerabilities, the fifth step is to produce a risk assessment and 
mitigation plan, which is then briefed to the Authorization 
Official for authorization. The sixth step of the RMF process is 
continuous monitoring of the system with respect to 
cybersecurity. As the system and threat environment evolve 
over time, security control effectiveness needs to be 
continuously assessed while keeping in mind future changes 
and cybersecurity impact. 
The RMF is the mostly widely implement approach of those 
surveyed as it is mandatory for DoD information systems to 
receive an authorization to operate.  While this approach has 
mitigated vulnerabilities, many site its perceived difficulty, 
steep learning curve, and IT centric focus as currently 
implemented as critiques in its utility for complex cyber-
physical systems. 
E. Avionics Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment and 
Mitigation (ACVAM) and Cyber Hardening Efforts 
The United States Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), 
in conjunction with the Air Force Institute of Technology’s 
Center for Cyberspace Research, developed an Avionics 
Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation 
(ACVAM) Workshop [38]. This weapon-system-specific 
workshop teaches a thorough analysis approach by 
systematically identifying and assessing all external inputs and 
communications paths to and from a weapon system (i.e., an 
exhaustive boundary analysis of the system’s architecture). The 
major activities include gathering information, identifying and 
analyzing access points, finding and analyzing susceptibilities, 
anticipating attacks, and applying and recommending 
mitigations and protections. The ACVAM approach requires 
extensive Subject Matter Expert (SME) involvement, access to 
design documents, and detailed operator insight to discover 
susceptibilities and determine appropriate mitigations to 
increase mission assurance by eliminating or reducing 
vulnerability to cyberattacks [39]. 
Additionally, AFRL is developing more specific cyber 
hardening tools and resiliency instructions [40]. While specific 
details are not publicly available, the cyber hardening approach 
was recently briefed to the defense community at large [39]. In 
general, this approach describes avionics cyber hardening and 
resiliency concepts and suggests ways to protect avionics and 
related systems from cyber-attack. Moreover, this approach 
encourages engineers to ‘think avionics cyber’ using three 
tenets of cyber protection: focus on what’s critical; restrict 
access to the critical; and detect, react, and adapt [41].  These 
approaches provide a robust analysis but require technically 
savvy domain experts to execute, which restricts its utility for a 
larger group of complex systems. 
F. Attack Path Analysis via Automotive Example 
Historically, attack path analysis has served the security 
community well [42]. In a great example from the automotive 
domain, Checkoway et al. provide a practical attack path 
analysis and comprehensive discussion which solidifies the 
importance of threat modeling as a cybersecurity architectural 
analysis technique [8]. While this specific example is 
automobile centric, many similarities are shared between cyber-
physical systems. More specifically, the work details a four-
step method of analyses. First, threat model characterization is 
accomplished through identification of external attack vectors 
and attack surfaces. Second, vulnerability analysis addresses the 
accessibility, criticality, and exploitability of potential 
vulnerabilities. Third, a threat assessment attempts to gauge the 
attacker’s motivation by answering the question of what utility 
a given attack path has for the attacker. Finally, the approach 
suggests mitigation actions by synthesizing similarities among 
vulnerabilities to provide pragmatic recommendations for 
enhancing the system’s cybersecurity. 
G. System Theory Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec) 
In recent work, MIT’s System Theory Process Analysis 
(STPA) approach for safety was extended to focus on 
security-related concerns, known as STPA-Sec [43]. The goal 
of this approach is to ensure mission-critical functions are 
maintained in the face of disruption(s). Starting from a strategic 
viewpoint, system developers and users can proactively shape 
the operational environment by controlling specified mission 
critical system risks. This top-down approach elevates the 
security problem from guarding the system (or network) against 
all potential attack paths to a higher-level problem of assuring 
the system’s critical functions. The STPA-Sec steps include: 
identifying unacceptable losses, identifying system hazards 
(vulnerabilities), drawing the system functional control 
structure, and identifying unsafe or insecure CAs [43]. This 
method has been embraced by defense and commercial 
industries with several favorable case studies [44]. 
H. Functional Mission Analysis for Cyber (FMA-C) 
The DoD has adopted Functional Mission Analysis for 
Cyber (FMA-C) as an approach to secure operational computer 
networks [45]. FMA-C is being taught to thousands of airmen 
in an effort to assure critical cyber systems and reduce 
vulnerabilities. While the structure and content of FMA-C is 
similar to STPA-Sec, its application is tailored to As-Is 
Information Technology infrastructures. In practice, USAF 
Mission Defense Teams apply FMA-C to fielded cyber 
systems to identify mission critical vulnerabilities. It has 
proved to be a useful tool for understanding and mitigating 
risks in traditional cyber (i.e. ICT) domains.  
I. Other Notable Methodologies 
As previously noted, other methodologies and frameworks 
for systems-level security analysis are sure to exist which are 
not covered in this work. A few notable works focused on 
mission assurance are available here [46], [47], [48] and on 
software here [49], [50]. 
IV. DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS FOR                                            
CONDUCTING CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS  
This section identifies desirable characteristics for 
cybersecurity architectural analysis and cross-examines the 
approaches discussed in Section III.   
A. Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Characteristics 
The first characteristic is definitional in nature and classifies 
approaches as either top-down or bottom-up. Those defined as 
top-down start with analysis at the function level with 
identification and examination of critical missions and/or 
capabilities—sometimes operations depending on how the 
approach is being applied. As is typical of architecting for new 
systems (and sometimes upgrades), higher-level functional 
analysis leads to further functional decomposition and 
allocation to a more specific form (e.g., lower subsystems, 
elements, or components). These approaches lend themselves to 
the identification of stakeholder security needs, early trade-offs, 
thorough security requirements definition, and integration of 
more holistic security solutions [27].  
Conversely, bottom-up approaches begin with the form in 
mind (i.e., the physical or technological solution) and often 
focus on perimeter security through boundary analysis [51]. 
While this approach successfully identifies vulnerabilities in 
networked components, it is often less useful for protecting 
systems from intelligent adversaries. For example, Bayuk and 
Horowitz [52] surmise that perimeter defense tactics are largely 
ineffective, and conclude that a top-down, risk-based systems 
engineering approach to system security should be used instead. 
The next key characteristic is whether the approach should 
be driven by threats or vulnerabilities. Prior research suggests 
that the foundation for improving system security starts with an 
analysis of potential threats, which leads to more appropriate 
security requirements for implementation [42]. This is intuitive; 
without first understanding the adversary—system-specific 
threats (and their rapid agility)—it is difficult, or impossible, to 
defend against them. Understanding and modeling the threat 
becomes a critical prerequisite for generating and developing 
secure systems [53]. Once the model has been developed and 
validated, vulnerability analysis is the logical follow-on. With 
the threats understood, the system architecture can be analyzed 
for vulnerable access points through techniques such as attack 
path analysis and/or red teaming.  
While acknowledging the rapidly changing nature of 
threats, the exercise of red teaming and brainstorming potential 
attack paths is a helpful critical thinking exercise for ensuring 
sound cybersecurity practices. Moreover, threat modeling and 
vulnerability analysis typically form the foundation for 
cybersecurity architectural analysis. While threat modeling 
alone does not ensure cybersecurity, rigorous threat modeling 
and vulnerability analysis are helpful for ensuring the security 
of realized systems. However, more focus should be applied to 
providing security solutions and not just focused on identifying 
problems. 
In today’s highly contested cyberspace environment, 
documentation-based engineering is largely ineffective against 
dynamic adversaries [42]. Developing a successful response to 
a dynamic adversary necessitates the tools and methods used to 
develop countermeasures be, in kind, dynamic. In response to 
these complexities, Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) 
offers an integrated modeling approach capable of mapping 
desired capabilities to functions (and even components), as well 
as providing traceability and fit-for-purpose views to enable 
more effective decision-making [54]. In a recent effort, Apvrille 
and Roudier proposed SysML-Sec, an injection of security 
considerations into SysML in an effort to foster integration 
between system designers and security experts [55]. SysML-
Sec and more generally MBSE approaches enable security-
focused computer simulations of a potential system 
architecture. These executable architectures provide 
tremendous value by providing insights into early design trade-
off analysis [56]. While MBSE requires significant initial 
investment in tools and training, it significantly increases the 
depth of possible architectural analysis especially in executable 
architectures. 
B. Assesment of Architectural Analysis Approaches 
 Table I provides a consolidated assessment (i.e., a mapping) 
of the proposed architectural analysis characteristics to the 
surveyed approaches from Section III. This mapping seeks to 
provide a consolidated reference for differentiating approaches 
to inform the user and assist in selecting an appropriate 
cybersecurity architectural approach which meets the 
stakeholders’ needs. Consideration is given to each approaches’ 
usability, scalability, and tool availability. The ideal approach 
will also easily facilitate modeling and simulation studies to 
perform early design feasibility studies and support trade-off 
analysis (i.e., MBSE). 
 In general, bottom-up approaches are relatively systematic; 
however, historically they have not produced secure systems 
and tend to scale poorly. Top-down approaches have the benefit 
of being more scalable, but they often require a high level of 
tool proficiency to effectively model (thus, the potential of 
MBSE to systems security is largely missed). While 
vulnerability analysis is inherent in every approach, a threat- 
based approach is less so. This aspect is important because 
effectively safeguarding unprecedented, complex systems 
requires more than a good architectural tool or technique – a 
holistic engineering approach that embraces all aspects of 
security (e.g., people, processes, policy, technology, feasibility, 
cost, etc.) is required [57], [58].   
TABLE I: ARCHITECTURAL APPROACHES TO CHARACTERISTICS MAPPING. 
 Top 
Down 
Bottom 
Up 
Threat 
Driven 
Vul. 
Based 
MBSE 
Integrated 
MBSE 
Executable  
Tool 
Based 
DoDAF + 
Richards 
X1   X X X4 X 
CRAF X
1  X X X X X 
UAF 
Security 
X   X X X4 X 
ACVAM  X X X    
STPA-Sec X
2   X    
RMF  X
5 X X X3   
1. Promotes a top-down approach after mission functions are identified (i.e., 
does not include mission thread analysis). 
2. Approach begins at a higher level than other approaches examined (i.e., 
includes mission thread analysis) and includes lower level analysis. 
3. Suggests using MBSE, but not required and often not considered. 
4. Would require pairing with additional modeling & simulation plugin. 
5. RMF is intended to be a top-down approach but is often applied bottom-up 
using security control compliance based on system type. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The practice of architectural analysis is not new; however, 
in the context of complex cyber-physical systems, the role of 
architectural analysis with respect to cybersecurity is not well 
understood. Moreover, given cybersecurity’s widespread 
interest, it was surprising to find a general lack of 
understanding or consistency regarding what it means to 
conduct architectural analysis for cybersecurity while surveying 
the literature. Thus, this work briefly surveys key architectural 
analysis concepts and provides a timely and widely applicable 
working definition of “cybersecurity architectural analysis” for 
the community to consider. Next, a survey of several 
cybersecurity architectural analysis approaches from industry 
and government is provided, along with an assessment of their 
applicability for complex cyber-physical systems according to 
several desirable characteristics. These results help practitioners 
and researchers understand how to achieve more effective 
cybersecurity architectural analysis efforts in order to develop 
secure systems according to stakeholders needs.    
While there are several promising cybersecurity 
architectural approaches, each with unique aspects to be more 
fully explored, standardized approaches such as UAF paired 
with MBSE hold promise and have a wider acceptance than 
some alternatives. In the near term, the authors have chosen to 
explore STPA-Sec to more fully understand its utility as a 
relatively simple architectural analysis approach to assist in the 
development of safe, secure, and resiliency military systems. 
Specifically, the authors are executing a detailed case study for 
a next-generation aircraft refueling system. This case study 
focuses on understanding the utility of the STPA-Sec approach 
for eliciting cybersecurity and resiliency requirements when 
developing complex military systems (i.e., unprecedented 
cyber-physical systems of systems). Ultimately, continued 
research in this field will enable more effective and efficient 
cybersecurity architectural analysis for complex systems 
regardless of application domain. 
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III. Methodology 
Description: 
Chapter III is a self-contained conference paper that details the methodology, 
STPA-Sec. It presents a tailored approach for STPA-Sec as a conceptual analysis of a 
complex cyber physical system.  A simple example for a space system is presented. The 
background of this research introduced in Chapter II is re-presented for context. 
This work answers research question 4 by presenting a tailored approach for 
STPA-Sec exemplified through an abbreviated space system example.  
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Abstract—In today’s highly interconnected and technology 
reliant environment, systems security is rapidly growing in 
importance. Moreover, security is no longer limited to traditional 
computer systems and IT networks, as a number of highly 
publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical 
systems such as automobiles and airplanes. While systems security 
analysis approaches are critical to improving the security of these 
systems-of-systems, such approaches are often poorly understood 
and applied in ad hoc fashion. This work addresses such gaps by 
detailing a relatively straight forward security analysis approach 
for understanding, defining, and specifying security requirements. 
First, a readily understandable description of key architectural 
analysis concepts and definitions is provided along with an 
assessment of their applicability to complex cyber-physical 
systems. Next, a variant of the System Theory Process Analysis 
approach for Security (STPA-Sec) is detailed in three phases 
which support development of functional-level security 
requirements, applicable design-level criteria, and architectural-
level security specifications in alignment with the stated systems 
and software engineering processes in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and 
the recently released NIST SP 800-160. This work is important for 
advancing the science of systems security engineering by 
providing a viable systems security analysis approach for eliciting 
and capturing traceable security, safety, and resiliency 
requirements and criteria that can be designed-for, built-to, and 
formally verified. 
Keywords—security; systems security analysis; system 
architecture; systems security engineering 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The cybersecurity threat is one of the most serious 
challenges in the 21st century. Over the past decade, attacks 
against Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
have grown considerably in frequency and complexity, and it is 
now commonplace to hear of widespread attacks against 
personal computers, webservers and services, Internet of Things 
(IoT) devices, and even critical government databases. 
Moreover, the security of cyber-physical devices is becoming 
increasingly important as these devices take on central roles in 
nearly every aspect of modern life. Previously, cyber-physical 
systems such as automobiles and airplanes were complicated, 
but not interactively complex. Security (and safety) is now an 
emergent properly of cyber-physical systems, where their 
software and real-time networks require previously isolated 
components to continuously interact [1]. For example, the 2017 
Ford F-150, a fairly common vehicle in the United States, has 
over 150 million lines of code distributed across dozens of 
computing devices with software providing its essential 
functionality [2], [3]. Moreover, adversaries are challenging 
traditional assumptions that cyber-physical systems are secure 
due to their relative isolation and uniqueness with recent 
examples including the widely publicized hacking 
demonstration against a Jeep Cherokee [4], claims of hacking a 
commercial airliner [5], and comprehensive reports of vehicular 
attack paths [6]. 
In light of these growing threats, it is critical for security 
professionals to have appropriate tools and techniques for 
performing systems security engineering and analysis. For 
example, the United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD) 
which historically values systems security, has made several 
recent changes to expand traditional IT-focused security 
approaches and mandate security assessments for cyber-
physical weapon systems [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. These 
policies dictate that acquisition programs integrate security 
efforts into existing systems engineering processes, and work to 
ensure security considerations hold equal footing with other 
requirements and design trade-offs at major program reviews. 
However, it is not easy to understand what constitutes a 
“secure” system, nor how to specify effective security criteria as 
stated in Good’s 1986 challenge essay [13]: 
The first thing we need in this process is the ability to state 
computer security requirements clearly and precisely… so 
that a competent professional can study it for a reasonably 
short amount of time and, say, “Oh, yes, I agree. If you build 
that particular system to that particular requirement, it's 
secure enough for that particular purpose.”  
These security requirements are critically important because 
they establish the foundation upon which analysis and evidences 
are used to “judge whether a system is ‘secure’” [13]. 
 For cyber-physical systems (i.e., highly complex systems-
of-systems), architectural analysis is often viewed as a critical 
enabler for systems security analysis; however, these 
approaches are typically focused on lower-level security 
decisions. Moreover, they are often poorly understood and 
applied in ad hoc fashion. To addresses these gaps this work 
suggests a relatively straightforward systems security analysis 
approach for understanding, defining, and specifying security 
requirements for complex cyber-physical systems. First, a brief 
discussion of architectural analysis concepts is provided in 
Section II along with a working definition of “cybersecurity 
architectural analysis” since none exists in the literature. Section 
III surveys several systems-oriented security architecture 
analysis approaches from government and industry, while 
Section IV assesses how these approaches can be used to more 
effectively support a holistic systems security analysis approach 
 
 
for a given System of Interest (SoI). Based on these results, a 
variant of the System Theory Process Analysis approach for 
Security (STPA-Sec) is detailed in Section V along with an 
example in Section VI. Of note, our suggested conceptual-level 
focused systems security analysis approach is tailorable and 
comprises three phases of increasing detail which result in 
security requirements, architectural security considerations, and 
design-level security criteria. Of great importance, these three 
phases align with the established systems and software 
engineering processes in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and the recently 
released NIST Special Publication 800-160, Systems Security 
Engineering [14], [15]. 
Lastly, Section VII summarizes key findings and identifies 
promising follow-on research areas for increasing the rigorous 
application of systems security engineering and accompanying 
analysis approaches for developing secure, safe, and resilient 
systems – those which can be more easily understood, defined, 
specified, implemented, and verified. Because of the Authors’ 
affiliation with the U.S. DoD, as well as, the DoD’s 
unparalleled investment in systems security, much of the work 
presented in this paper has an obvious U.S. DoD perspective; 
however, this should not hinder the contribution of this work to 
other domains as our intention is to promote and advance the 
science of security with respect to understanding the effective 
application of systems security engineering processes, activities, 
and tasks regardless of the SoI or application domain. 
II. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
This section provides historical context for discussing 
system-level architectural analysis and, more formally, 
discusses key definitions for understanding architectural 
analysis for security (i.e., cybersecurity architectural analysis). 
Much of the seminal work in the field of architectural analysis 
was accomplished by Zachman, who proposed the first system 
architecture – a logical construct for capturing, presenting, and 
integrating the complexities of modern information systems 
[16]. Akin to the multitude of perspectives intrinsic to 
construction blueprints (e.g., structural, plumbing, electrical, 
etc.), Zachman argued that system architectures should be 
composed from many perspectives with varying levels of detail. 
Furthermore, he insisted that these perspectives (or views) be 
synchronized across the system, forming one integrated 
architecture. 
Sowa expanded Zachman’s work to form the Information 
Systems Architecture (ISA) framework shown in Fig. 1 [17]. 
Across the ISA framework the interrogatives (what, how, 
where, who, when, and why) are explored with six perspectives 
(shown as rows) as a means of expressing relationships at 
varying levels of detail to guide complex system development 
[18]. Thus, the ISA establishes a baseline to enable effective 
decision making for new system developments by comparing 
and elaborating on desired capabilities, requirements, 
components, and functions in a single well-integrated, 
enterprise-level model (note, not all 36 views are required; thus, 
the ISA is also tailorable). Since its inception, the ISA – 
commonly known as “the Zachman Framework” – has been a 
popular choice for system architects; it has been widely used for 
decades, while several other system-level frameworks have 
incorporated or adopted its tenets [19]. 
A. Key Definitions 
As a prerequisite for understanding and assessing the 
utilization of architectural analysis approaches for security 
decision making, a brief discussion of key definitions is offered. 
First, please note that we use the term “cybersecurity” in this 
work as it now seems to be the prevailing pseudonym for 
“security” regardless of intentionality or context (see sidebar in 
[20]). While several competing definitions exist, within the U.S. 
DoD, cybersecurity is formally defined as [21]: 
The prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration 
of electronic systems to ensure its availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. 
While comprehensive, the U.S. DoD’s definition for the 
purpose of analyzing cyber-physical SoI is somewhat hindered 
because it is saturated with domain-specific IT jargon, where: 
availability ensures the system is usable as anticipated; integrity 
is the protection from unauthorized modification; confidentiality 
is keeping data private; authentication is a validation of the 
claimed identity; and non-repudiation is the ability to prove that 
an action has taken place [22]. A more practical systems-
oriented description of security might simply seek to prevent 
hazardous functionality which leads to potentially unsafe 
system states with unacceptable losses [23]. 
 The next key term to define is “architecture” where we 
interpret “architecture” synonymously with “system 
architecture” and variations thereof. As a well-known standard 
ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 provides a rather straightforward 
definition for system architecture [24]: 
The fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its 
components, their relationship to each other and to the 
environment, and the principles governing its design and 
evolution. 
While this definition is readily understandable, it is somewhat 
focused on the SoI’s physical realization and does not capture 
the desired holistic nature necessary for performing systems 
security engineering and analysis [25]. Another classically 
understood definition is provided by Maier and Rechtin [26]: 
Structure in terms of components, connections, and 
constraints of a product, process, or element.  
This definition offers a more holistic view of the SoI to include 
both technological and non-technological aspects. It also 
provides a means for viewing the system from different 
perspectives with multiple levels of abstraction as purported by 
Zachman. With a full life cycle focused perspective, the U.S. 
DoD provides a progressive definition for consideration [27]: 
A set of abstractions (or models) that simplify and 
communicate complex structures, processes, rules, and 
constraints to improve understanding and implementation. 
Although somewhat conceptual, this definition alerts the reader 
to the intrinsic value offered by architectural efforts in that they 
serve to improve communication amongst multiple team 
members and increase understanding of complex systems with 
the goal of improving the SoI’s implementation (i.e., its 
physical realization). 
 
 
Lastly, the task of identifying a formal definition of 
“analysis” within the context of a systems architecture proved 
more difficult than anticipated. This is because system 
architectures often center on an integrated model of entities and 
the relationships between the entities to facilitate order and 
understandability, not analytical capability. One such definition 
reads as follows [28]: 
Architectural analysis is the activity of discovering 
important system properties using conceptual and physical 
models of the system of interest.  
However, an architecture’s purpose is to increase understanding 
and facilitate trade-offs focused on evaluating and comparing 
alternative designs and attributes (e.g., security, performance, 
reliability, etc.) [15], [19]. This two-fold purpose is acutely 
captured by Crawley et al. [29]: 
Architectural analysis focuses on understanding both the 
architecture’s function and form for the purpose of 
supporting decision making. 
This definition reflects both the architecture’s inherent ability to 
manage complexity and enable analysis in support of more 
effective decision making. Ultimately, architectural analysis 
requires consideration of various missions, essential functions, 
components, and desired system attributes which help to clarify 
and refine stakeholder needs and system requirements. Thus, 
architectural analysis should identify trade-off points among 
competing options and enable more effective communication 
between various stakeholders (e.g., customers, developers, 
operators, maintainers). 
B. Proposed Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Definition 
Architectural analysis provides a means for understanding 
cyber (i.e., ICT) dependencies within the functions and form of 
the desired system. This type of structured analysis brings an 
otherwise unmanageable amount of information under control 
in support of well-informed system security engineering 
decisions [30]. More holistically, architectural analysis enables 
pragmatic risk management by providing context and functional 
mapping to the various physical elements of the SoI. Thus, 
cybersecurity architectural analysis facilitates the application of 
appropriate security mitigations where needed with rigorous 
justification. 
After considering the seminal definitions presented above 
(and others not discussed) and working to understand the 
architectural analysis approaches for cybersecurity discussed in 
Section III, we propose a working definition of cybersecurity 
architectural analysis for consideration:  
The activity of discovering and evaluating the function and 
form of a desired system to facilitate cybersecurity decisions. 
This definition is easily understandable and addresses both the 
conceptual-level analysis associated with new system 
development (i.e., studying the desired functionality) and 
lower-level considerations for existing systems (i.e., comparing 
the desired functionality to the existing form). 
III. CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS APPROACHES 
In this section, we survey architectural analysis approaches 
for complex system cybersecurity. Within the U.S. DoD (and its 
major defense contractors), several approaches (i.e., methods, 
processes, and tools) have been developed to secure and assess 
the cybersecurity of complex systems and systems-of-systems. 
This survey is based on publicly available literature and 
presentations that focus specifically on architectural analysis for 
weapon systems. The predecessor for many cybersecurity 
architectural analysis approaches is compliance-based 
Information Assurance (IA), which focuses almost exclusively 
on applying security controls to computer networks and IT 
 
FIG 1. THE ZACHMAN FRAMEWORK FOR ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE [27]. 
 
 
systems. For complex systems this approach is inadequate as 
demonstrated by several high profile security breaches [31].  
A. Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF) 
The integrated architecture currently in use by the U.S. DoD 
is the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF). Its purpose is to 
manage complexity to enable key decisions through organized 
information sharing [27]. However, in DoDAF, like many other 
architecture frameworks, security (or cybersecurity) is not 
specifically addressed [32]. James Richards, in his work Using 
the Department of Defense Architecture Framework to Develop 
Security Requirements [30], proposes a methodology for using 
DoDAF to derive security requirements. He outlines a process 
of first building an architectural model of the enterprise, 
focusing on a core set of views including the OV-5b operational 
activity model, the DIV-2 logical data model, and the OV-3 
operational resource flow matrix. These critical views are used 
to model security-relevant processes, data, business rules, and 
communications. Next, he suggests comparing views for 
compliance and then assessing and refining the architecture. 
The overall purpose of Richards’ approach is to use DoDAF to 
expose or derive security requirements [30]. 
B. Unified Architecture Framework (UAF)  
In contrast to the U.S. DoD unique solution DoDAF, 
industry has developed the Unified Architecture Framework 
(UAF) [33]. Based on industry need, the UAF includes a formal 
security domain amongst the more common architectural views. 
The UAF security domain includes views for security 
taxonomy, structure, connectivity, processes, constraints, and 
traceability. More specifically, it uses SysML class diagrams to 
identify data types and map them to protections and security 
controls. As an integrated architecture, it allows security-
relevant elements to be mapped to system resources and 
operations. UAF also capitalizes on the success of MBSE 
efforts to depict and analyze the security properties of a SoI via 
an executable architecture. Note, UAF is in the final stages of 
development, so its utility has yet to be fully realized; however, 
the proposed security views appear to be useful for conducting 
cybersecurity architectural analysis [34]. 
C. Publically Avilable Industry Efforts 
Major defense contractors often use custom architectural 
analysis approaches to design and evaluate their system 
architectures with respect to cybersecurity. Although it is likely 
that most large U.S. DoD contractors are working solutions in 
this area; at the time of this survey, the authors were only 
exposed to efforts from Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and 
Lockheed Martin. Note, Raytheon’s Cyber Resiliency 
Architecture Framework (CRAF) was the only approach with a 
detailed open source publication available. Limited information 
is available on Northrop and Lockheed’s approaches. 
Raytheon developed CRAF using a DoDAF reference 
architecture with extensions for specific cyber resilience 
mappings and metrics [35]. The goal of CRAF is to assess and 
identify gaps in cyber resiliency by mapping systems, 
subsystems, and components against prioritized capabilities to 
identify resilience requirements for important mission scenarios.  
Using failure modes and effects analysis, Northrop 
Grumman created a risk-based assessment methodology using 
an integrated architecture modeled in the new UAF to identify 
cyber risks for their systems [34]. This approach is still under 
development and is one of the first systems security efforts 
based on the upcoming UAF standard security views from the 
Object Management Group (OMG). 
 Lockheed Martin has created a custom solution titled the 
Secure Engineering Assurance Model (SEAM) [36]. SEAM is a 
tailored systems security engineering approach to integrate 
security into every solution they deliver. This framework 
provides tailored security considerations and checklists for each 
program area. 
D. Risk Management Framework (RMF) for Cybersecurity 
In response to increasing risks against critical infrastructure 
and information technology systems, the US government 
enacted the Federal Information Security Management Act of 
2002 which established minimum information security 
requirements for federal information systems, and charged the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with 
developing security standards and guidelines to address these 
growing risks [37]. In response to this requirement, NIST 
created the Risk Management Framework (RMF) which 
provided a structured yet flexible process for applying these 
standards and guidelines [38]. Accordingly, RMF is the 
mandated approach for addressing cybersecurity in the U.S. 
DoD [10]. In general, this approach applies a prescriptive risk-
based methodology to cybersecurity with the goal of 
identifying, mitigating, and eliminating system vulnerabilities to 
protect systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction. Within the United 
States Air Force, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center 
is tasked with conducting RMF for legacy weapon systems 
(designated as the Platform IT (PIT) systems) [39]. This PIT 
assessment and authorization process consists of six steps 
described in the next paragraph [12]. 
First, the team must categorize the PIT system according to 
the information displayed, processed, stored, and transmitted 
along with the classification of the information and associated 
technologies. Second, security controls are selected (or 
assigned) based on the impact resulting from the loss of said 
information (i.e., criticality analysis) [11]. The third step is 
implementing said controls with consideration for cybersecurity 
requirements across the entire system development life cycle—
although security controls have been historically applied to IT 
systems, many have been tailored for PIT systems with 
prescribed overlays [39]. The fourth step is key to the RMF 
process and assesses the effectiveness of applied security 
controls through threat mapping and vulnerability analysis. On a 
related note, much of the security work conducted today is 
exclusively focused on this step. Based on the identified 
vulnerabilities, the fifth step is to produce a risk assessment and 
mitigation plan, which is then briefed to the Authorization 
Official for authorization. The sixth step of the RMF process is 
continuous monitoring of the system with respect to 
cybersecurity. As the system and threat environment evolve 
over time, security control effectiveness needs to be 
continuously assessed while keeping in mind future changes 
and cybersecurity impact. 
 
 
E. Avionics Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment and 
Mitigation (ACVAM) and Cyber Hardening Efforts 
The United States Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), 
in conjunction with the Air Force Institute of Technology’s 
Center for Cyberspace Research, developed an Avionics 
Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation 
(ACVAM) Workshop [40]. This weapon-system-specific 
workshop teaches a thorough analysis approach by 
systematically identifying and assessing all external inputs and 
communications paths to and from a weapon system (i.e., an 
exhaustive boundary analysis of the system’s architecture). The 
major activities include gathering information, identifying and 
analyzing access points, finding and analyzing susceptibilities, 
anticipating attacks, and applying and recommending 
mitigations and protections. The ACVAM approach requires 
extensive Subject Matter Expert (SME) involvement, access to 
design documents, and detailed operator insight to discover 
susceptibilities and determine appropriate mitigations to 
increase mission assurance by eliminating or reducing 
vulnerability to cyberattacks [41]. 
Additionally, AFRL is developing more specific cyber 
hardening tools and resiliency instructions [42]. While specific 
details are not publicly available, the cyber hardening approach 
was recently briefed to the defense community at large [41]. In 
general, this approach describes avionics cyber hardening and 
resiliency concepts and suggests ways to protect avionics and 
related systems from cyber-attack. Moreover, this approach 
encourages engineers to ‘think avionics cyber’ using three 
tenets of cyber protection: focus on what’s critical; restrict 
access to the critical; and detect, react, and adapt [43].  
F. Attack Path Analysis via Automotive Example 
Historically, attack path analysis has served the security 
community well [44]. In a great example from the automotive 
domain, Checkoway et al. provide a practical attack path 
analysis and comprehensive discussion which solidifies the 
importance of threat modeling as a cybersecurity architectural 
analysis technique [6]. While this specific example is 
automobile centric, many similarities are shared between cyber-
physical systems. More specifically, the work details a four-step 
method of analyses. First, threat model characterization is 
accomplished through identification of external attack vectors 
and attack surfaces. Second, vulnerability analysis addresses the 
accessibility, criticality, and exploitability of potential 
vulnerabilities. Third, a threat assessment attempts to gauge the 
attacker’s motivation by answering the question of what utility a 
given attack path has for the attacker. Finally, the approach 
suggests mitigation actions by synthesizing similarities among 
vulnerabilities to provide pragmatic recommendations for 
enhancing the system’s cybersecurity. 
G. System Theory Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec) 
In recent work, MIT’s System Theory Process Analysis 
(STPA) approach for safety was extended to focus on 
security-related concerns, known as STPA-Sec [45]. The goal of 
this approach is to ensure mission-critical functions are 
maintained in the face of disruption(s). Starting from a strategic 
viewpoint, system developers and users can proactively shape 
the operational environment by controlling specified mission 
critical system risks. This top-down approach elevates the 
security problem from guarding the system (or network) against 
all potential attack paths to a higher-level problem of assuring 
the system’s critical functions. The STPA-Sec steps include: 
identifying unacceptable losses, identifying system hazards 
(vulnerabilities), drawing the system functional control 
structure, and identifying unsafe or insecure CAs [45]. This 
method has been embraced by defense and commercial 
industries with several favorable case studies [46]. 
H. Functional Mission Analysis for Cyber (FMA-C) 
The DoD has adopted Functional Mission Analysis for 
Cyber (FMA-C) as an approach to secure operational computer 
networks [47]. FMA-C is being taught to thousands of airmen 
in an effort to assure critical cyber systems and reduce 
vulnerabilities. While the structure and content of FMA-C is 
similar to STPA-Sec, its application is tailored to As-Is 
Information Technology infrastructures. In practice, USAF 
Mission Defense Teams apply FMA-C to fielded cyber systems 
to identify mission critical vulnerabilities. It has proved to be a 
useful tool for understanding and mitigating risks in traditional 
cyber (i.e. ICT) domains.  
I. Other Notable Methodologies 
As previously noted, other methodologies and frameworks 
for systems-level security analysis are sure to exist which are 
not covered in this work. A few notable works focused on 
mission assurance are available here [48], [49], [50] and on 
software here [51], [52]. 
IV. CHARACTERISTICS FOR EFFECTIVE                                           
CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS  
This section identifies desirable characteristics for 
cybersecurity architectural analysis and cross-examines the 
approaches discussed in Section III. 
A. Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Characteristics 
The first characteristic is definitional in nature and classifies 
approaches as either top-down or bottom-up. Those defined as 
top-down start with analysis at the function level with 
identification and examination of critical missions and/or 
capabilities—sometimes operations depending on how the 
approach is being applied. As is typical of architecting for new 
systems (and sometimes upgrades), higher-level functional 
analysis leads to further functional decomposition and 
allocation to a more specific form (e.g., lower subsystems, 
elements, or components). These approaches lend themselves to 
the identification of stakeholder security needs, early trade-offs, 
thorough security requirements definition, and integration of 
more holistic security solutions [15].  
Conversely, bottom-up approaches begin with the form in 
mind (i.e., the physical or technological solution) and often 
focus on perimeter security through boundary analysis [53]. 
While this approach successfully identifies vulnerabilities in 
networked components, it is often less useful for protecting 
systems from intelligent adversaries. For example, Bayuk and 
Horowitz [54] surmise that perimeter defense tactics are largely 
ineffective, and conclude that a top-down, risk-based systems 
engineering approach to system security should be used instead. 
 
 
The next key characteristic is whether the approach should 
be driven by threats or vulnerabilities. Prior research suggests 
that the foundation for improving system security starts with an 
analysis of potential threats, which leads to more appropriate 
security requirements for implementation [44]. This is intuitive; 
without first understanding the adversary—system-specific 
threats (and their rapid agility)—it is difficult, or impossible, to 
defend against them. Understanding and modeling the threat 
becomes a critical prerequisite for generating and developing 
secure systems [55]. Once the model has been developed and 
validated, vulnerability analysis is the logical follow-on. With 
the threats understood, the system architecture can be analyzed 
for vulnerable access points through techniques such as attack 
path analysis and/or red teaming.  
While acknowledging the rapidly changing nature of threats, 
the exercise of red teaming and brainstorming potential attack 
paths is a helpful critical thinking exercise for ensuring sound 
cybersecurity practices. Moreover, threat modeling and 
vulnerability analysis typically form the foundation for 
cybersecurity architectural analysis. While threat modeling 
alone does not ensure cybersecurity, rigorous threat modeling 
and vulnerability analysis are helpful for ensuring the security 
of realized systems. However, more focus should be applied to 
providing security solutions and not just focused on identifying 
problems. 
In today’s highly contested cyberspace environment, 
documentation-based engineering is largely ineffective against 
dynamic adversaries [44]. Developing a successful response to a 
dynamic adversary necessitates the tools and methods used to 
develop countermeasures be, in kind, dynamic. In response to 
these complexities, Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) 
offers an integrated modeling approach capable of mapping 
desired capabilities to functions (and even components), as well 
as providing traceability and fit-for-purpose views to enable 
more effective decision-making [56]. In a recent effort, Apvrille 
and Roudier proposed SysML-Sec, an injection of security 
considerations into SysML in an effort to foster integration 
between system designers and security experts [57]. SysML-Sec 
and more generally MBSE approaches enable security-focused 
computer simulations of a potential system architecture. These 
executable architectures provide tremendous value by providing 
insights into early design trade-off analysis [58]. While MBSE 
requires significant initial investment in tools and training, it 
significantly increases the depth of possible architectural 
analysis especially in executable architectures..  
B. Mapping of Characteristics to Approaches 
 Table I provides a mapping of the proposed architectural 
analysis characteristics to the surveyed approaches from Section 
III. This mapping seeks to provide a consolidated reference for 
differentiating approaches to inform the user and assist in 
selecting an appropriate cybersecurity architectural approach 
which meets the stakeholders’ needs. Consideration is given to 
each approaches’ usability, scalability, and tool availability. The 
ideal approach will also easily facilitate modeling and 
simulation studies to perform early design feasibility studies and 
support trade-off analysis (i.e., MBSE). 
 In general, bottom-up approaches are relatively systematic; 
however, historically they have not produced secure systems 
and tend to scale poorly. Top-down approaches have the benefit 
of being more scalable, but they often require a high level of 
tool proficiency to effectively model (thus, the potential of 
MBSE to systems security is largely missed). While 
vulnerability analysis is inherent in every approach, a threat- 
based approach is less so. This aspect is important because 
effectively safeguarding unprecedented, complex systems 
requires more than a good architectural tool or technique – a 
holistic engineering approach that embraces all aspects of 
security (e.g., people, processes, policy, technology, feasibility, 
cost, etc.) is required [59], [60]. 
 While providing a detailed case study for each approach 
surveyed in this work would be ideal, it is simply not feasible as 
some approaches take months if not years to complete. Thus, 
we chose to further explore STPA-Sec as relatively simple and 
effective means for performing systems security analysis for a 
complex SoI. For example, STPA-Sec can be accomplished 
without extensive training and can be accomplished in a matter 
of days rather than months [61]. While STPA-Sec does not 
formally use MBSE tools, this decision was primarily driven by 
STPA-Sec’s top-down approach which begins in the conceptual 
phase of the system life cycle—earlier than other approaches 
considered (e.g. starting with the Business or Mission Analysis 
technical processes in ISO/ISE/IEEE 15288) [61].  
 TABLE I: ARCHITECTURAL APPROACHES TO CHARACTERISTICS MAPPING. 
 Top 
Down 
Bottom 
Up 
Threat 
Driven 
Vul. 
Based 
MBSE 
Integrated 
MBSE 
Executable  
Tool 
Based 
DoDAF + 
Richards 
X1   X X X4 X 
CRAF X
1  X X X X X 
UAF 
Security 
X   X X X4 X 
ACVAM  X X X    
STPA-Sec X
2   X    
RMF  X5 X X X3   
1. Promotes a top-down approach after mission functions are identified (i.e., 
does not include mission thread analysis). 
2. Approach begins at a higher level than other approaches examined (i.e., 
includes mission thread analysis) and includes lower level analysis. 
3. Suggests using MBSE, but not required and often not considered. 
4. Would require pairing with additional modeling & simulation plugin. 
5. RMF is intended to be a top-down approach but is often applied bottom-up 
using security control compliance based on system type. 
V. SYSTEMS SECURITY STPA-SEC ANALYSIS APPROACH 
STPA-Sec is a promising approach for performing 
conceptual systems security analysis based on a methodology of 
systems theory dating back to Leveson’s original systems safety 
work which has been well received within the safety, 
aeronautical, and systems engineering communities [23], [46]. 
STPA-Sec is an extension of this methodology to the security 
domain and has been shown to effectively address security 
issues in complex cyber-physical systems [63]. In this section 
and the one that follows, we seek to highlight some of STPA-
Sec’s utility in facilitating early security and resiliency 
requirements generation with traceability to the stakeholders’ 
mission. 
In Table II, we present the STPA-Sec approach organized 
into three levels of systems security analysis: Conceptual, 
 
 
Architectural, and Design. Of great importance, these levels 
align well with the established systems and software 
engineering processes in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288, and the recently 
released NIST SP 800-160 [14], [15]. This systems-oriented 
approach begins at the highest level of abstraction with the 
Business/mission Analysis (BA) and Stakeholder Needs and 
requirements definition (SN) processes to define early security 
requirements. Next, the System Requirements definition (SR) 
and Architecture Definition (AR) processes explore potential 
architectures and the desired system capability from a functional 
level which results in architectural specific “design-to” criteria. 
In the third phase, potential general forms of the system are 
considered and analyzed in the Design definition (DE) process 
which results in specific “build-to” criteria. Table II provides a 
general assessment of each phase’s difficulty and duration, as 
well as, a listing of the number of STPA-Sec steps each of 
which are elaborated upon below. 
TABLE II: SYSTEMS SECURITY ANALYSIS STPA-SEC OVERVIEW. 
 Systems Security Oriented STPA-Sec Phases 
 Concept 
Analysis 
Architectural  
Analysis 
Design  
Analysis 
Purpose 
Determine 
Security 
Requirements 
Determine 
Design-To 
Criteria 
Determine 
Build-To 
Criteria 
ISO/IEC/IEEE 
Process 
BA/SN SR/AR DE 
Difficulty Easy Easy Moderate 
Duration Hours Days Weeks 
STPA-Sec Steps 4 Steps 5 Steps 5 Steps 
A. Concept Analysis 
As shown in Table III, the four conceptually-oriented 
STPA-Sec steps start with mission-level analysis to prevent the 
system from entering hazardous system states that could lead to 
unacceptable losses and mission failure. Beginning systems 
security analysis at the mission-level allows security engineers 
to more accurately understand the stakeholders’ needs and 
maximizes the engineering trade space as system goals are 
transformed into constraints (i.e., early safety, security, and 
resiliency requirements). 
TABLE III: STPA-SEC CONCEPT ANALYSIS.  
Step Description 
1. Define the SoI’s 
purpose and goal 
Capture the mission statement and key activities 
of the system: 
    1) A system to: (What) 
    2) By Means of: (How) 
    3) In Order to: (Why) 
2. Identify unacceptable 
losses 
Define high level, intolerable system outcomes 
to key stakeholders (e.g., loss of life, injury, 
damage to equipment, reputation, mission, etc.).  
3. Identify hazards 
Identify system states that when coupled with 
worst case conditions lead to an unacceptable 
loss. 
4. Develop system 
security constraints 
Develop mission-informed security constraints 
that prevent the system from entering hazardous 
states. These constraints are synonymous with 
early safety, security, and resiliency functional 
requirements. 
The first step of STPA-Sec defines the SoI’s mission in 
terms of a purpose and goal from the stakeholders’ perspective 
(akin to the BA and SN processes). This is done in a relatively 
straightforward fashion with emphasis on stakeholder 
involvement by standardizing the mission statement into three 
parts: 1) A system to 2) by means of 3) in order to. The first 
phrase “A system to” is meant to capture the primary purpose of 
the system (i.e., the What) in a few words. The “by means of” 
identifies the activities or processes the system uses to achieve 
its purpose (i.e., the How). Lastly, the “In order to” identifies 
the goal, or what mission the system contributes to (i.e., the 
Why). Accurately defining the desired system’s purpose and 
goal requires involvement from key stakeholders such as 
mission owner(s), operators, and users. Moreover, correctly 
defining the mission (or business case) provides a baseline for 
prioritizing and performing security tradeoffs within an 
operationally-focused paradigm.  
The second step of STPA-Sec identifies unacceptable losses. 
An unacceptable loss is an specific, unacceptable outcome as 
defined by mission and system owners (i.e., the key 
stakeholders). An unacceptable loss should be specific and at a 
high level. The system losses should identify what is of highest 
value to the stakeholders and differentiate from what is nice to 
have/desired. Unacceptable losses can be mission, personnel, or 
equipment loss; common unacceptable losses include loss of life 
and loss of mission essential equipment. Any outcome that a 
key stakeholder is concerned about should be identified. For 
example, loss of reputation or loss of critical data are examples 
of unacceptable losses that can be addressed through STPA-Sec. 
Given the importance of these unacceptable losses to the 
mission system and stakeholders, they provide key information 
to drive requirements for safety, survivability, and security. 
The third step identifies hazards that can contribute to these 
unacceptable losses. STPA defines a hazard as a system state 
(or set of conditions) that together with a worst-case set of 
environmental conditions will lead to an unacceptable loss [63]. 
The hazards identified should be within the system boundary 
and not themselves an environmental condition or external 
actor. As a general rule, hazards should be abstracted up to the 
highest level possible and in most cases the list of hazards will 
be fewer than 10. Identifying hazards can also serve to refine 
and clarify the list of unacceptable losses, as each hazard should 
be mapped to one or more unacceptable losses (otherwise it is 
not a hazard or the list of unacceptable losses is incomplete) 
[63]. 
Controlling hazards is STPA-Sec’s conceptual mechanism 
for delivering system cybersecurity. The mechanism is based on 
Leveson’s STAMP model that associates the high-level 
unacceptable losses as arising from control deficiencies across 
the system rather than component failures. The control 
deficiencies manifest as problems between components 
(interactions) rather than simple mechanical failures. The latter 
have been the traditional cause of failures in mechanical 
systems, but the former provides much more utility when 
developing contemporary large, software-intense systems. 
Hazardous states are a necessary precondition to loss. For 
example, if the unacceptable loss is two aircraft colliding, then 
the associated hazard could be generalized as failing to maintain 
safe separation between the aircraft. If safe separation is 
 
 
maintained, the two aircraft should never collide. The need for 
safe separation can be identified based on the first part of 
STPA-Sec. Ensuring safe separation is maintained (a control 
function) throughout operations is an engineering problem and 
can be addressed through systems engineering (secure systems 
engineering specifically). There are several different ways the 
violation might occur. The air traffic control system might be 
hacked or attacked. One or both of the aircraft might be 
subjected to a cyber attack. Likewise, there are any number of 
mitigations that can be used to address the hazard. However, at 
this stage of the System Engineering process, the hazardous 
functionality (safe separation not enforced) is already identified. 
In other words, loss prevention functionality (safe separation 
enforcement) is now identified and the remainder of the 
engineering process can focus on developing a suitable 
architecture to enforce this functionality. This approach allows 
engineers to handle safety and security in the same manner that 
all other emergent system properties are addressed. The systems 
approach does not preclude the need for reliable components. 
STPA-Sec still identifies scenarios involving component failure, 
but it also highlights complex, highly interactive scenarios 
involving management decisions, operations processes and 
operators. These other factors are also contributory to many 
losses. Therefore ensuring safe and secure operations must go 
beyond a focus on technology. 
The fourth step of the concept analysis phase is to develop 
system security constraints that prevent the SoI from entering 
one of the previously identified hazardous states. These 
constraints are restrictions placed on the system (and 
implemented via the security architecture) to bound operation 
within acceptable parameters. In this way, the first four steps of 
STPA-Sec begin to specify acceptable and non-acceptable 
system states which can eventually be formally tested and 
verified when the architecture is developed. The insights gained 
through STPA-Sec can also be used to inform and improve 
early MBSE efforts. These safety and security focused 
constraints also provide stakeholder-focused traceability for 
safety, security, and resiliency requirements which are 
important for system survivability (a critical issue in U.S. DoD 
systems [64]). 
B. Architectural Analysis 
STPA-Sec Architectural Analysis is a continuation of the 
conceptual phase and examines the SoI at the functional level 
(rather than a form specific implementation as is often the case 
in cybersecurity analyses). This approach maintains the largest 
trade space for potential solutions and helps ensure the desired 
system functionality is implemented without unnecessary 
architectural and design constrictions. 
Table IV details the necessary steps to perform STPA-Sec 
architectural analysis where a functional control model is used 
to represent the SoI. The functional control structure can be 
accomplished at various levels of abstraction such that an entire 
system is represented as a single model or it can be decomposed 
into multiple sub-models used to more specifically understand 
the control the SoI’s functions. This tailorable approach uses 
functional decomposition to more thoroughly understand critical 
mission-essential relationships between key actors and 
processes represented as Control Actions (CA). The phase 
begins with identification of all required CAs followed by an 
analysis of their criticality and how they contribute to 
preventing the SoI from entering hazardous states (akin to the 
SR process). The output of STPA-Sec Architectural analysis 
identifies potentially hazardous or unsecure CAs for a given 
system architecture (akin to the AR process). In essence these 
CAs form system level security requirements given a system 
architecture. 
 
TABLE IV: STPA-SEC ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS.  
Step Description 
1. Identify model 
elements 
Identify actor(s), controller(s), and controlled 
process(es) for the SoI at the desired level of 
abstraction. 
2. Identify each  
elements’ 
responsibilities 
Capture the description and actions planned to 
be taken for the model elements identified.  
3. Model control 
relationships 
Organize the model elements to pictorial 
show the relationships between elements in a 
functional control structure. 
4. Identify Control 
Actions (CA) 
Captures (in verb form) the actions necessary 
for each element to execute their 
responsibilities. 
5. Complete the CA 
analysis table  
This table systematically enumerates which 
hazards are caused by each CA identified in 
step 4.                                                                                           
The first step of this phase identifies each of the key model 
elements including actors, controllers, actuators, sensors, and 
controlled processes. Figure 2 illustrates a basic control 
structure example. Starting from the bottom of the model, the 
controlled process(es) is(are) the previously identified (Concept 
Analysis Step 1) activities the system uses to achieve its 
purpose. Beginning with these “How” activities, the primary 
task in step 1 of STPA-Sec architectural analysis is identifying 
the controller and actors responsible for performing the process. 
Once model elements are identified, then responsibilities for 
actors and controllers are populated in step 2. This step involves 
capturing these important responsibilities and assigning them to 
the appropriate actor for each controlled process (or action). 
These responsibilities can be identified from operational or 
system documentation, and in particular discussions with users, 
system SME’s, and other stakeholders. The third step primarily 
organizes the previously identified model elements into a 
functional control structure (i.e., a model) as shown in Figure 2. 
Step 4 identifies CAs for the system. A CA is a terse verb 
(action) statement capturing the execution of a function (or task) 
necessary to control the subject process. Populating the list of 
CAs begins with pairing down the responsibilities previously 
identified in step 2 into CAs that an actor or controller performs 
to manage the controlled process. CAs exist at various levels of 
abstraction based on the desired depth of analysis. Often it is 
best to start at the highest level of abstraction for the initial 
functional architectural analysis and then move to potentially 
hazardous actions as previously identified. 
The bulk of STPA-Sec architectural analysis resides in the 
fifth step – populating a CA analysis table (an example is 
provided in Section VI). This step requires a thorough analysis 
of each CA identified in step 4 and enumerates what, if any, 
hazardous conditions can be created by the systems’ actions. 
More specifically, each CA is evaluated across four scenarios: 
 
 
the CA is not provided; the CA is provided; the CA is provided 
too late, too early, or out of sequence; and the CA is stopped too 
soon or applied too long. This analysis clearly identifies when 
CAs need to be applied and not applied in order to prevent 
unsafe or unsecure hazardous states from occurring during 
system operation. This step provides an initial “design-to” 
criteria which is further decomposed and studied during design. 
FIG 2. STPA BASIC CONTROL STRUCTURE. FROM [63].  
 
C. Design Analysis 
The STPA-Sec Design Analysis phase studies the specifics 
of a CA using relatively simple process models and scenarios. 
These process models enumerate the decision logic, key 
variables, and acceptable variable values associated with each 
CA in a systematic and straight forward fashion. Additionally, 
this analysis identifies which feedback mechanism is 
responsible for those process model variable values (e.g., a 
sensor or computing mechanism). STPA-Sec design analysis 
focuses on more thoroughly understanding and specifying the 
CAs which prevent the SoI from entering potentially hazardous 
and unsecure states. The steps of design analysis are captured in 
Table V. 
Step 1 of STPA-Sec Design Analysis develops process 
model descriptions. During this step, it is advantageous to first 
generate process model descriptions for CAs determined as 
potentially hazardous from the completed STPA-Sec 
Architectural Analysis. This is because a complex system may 
have a large (and potentially overwhelming) number of process 
model descriptions. Each process model should briefly describe 
the scenario of interest and focus on when to execute a given 
CA with details such as identifying the specific system elements 
and potential responses to CAs. Additionally, the process model 
should include assumptions about the controlled process. 
In step 2, Process Model Variables (PMVs) are described as 
various conditions which indicate a system state (i.e., one of a 
number of discrete states the SoI could exist in). These 
conditions and states are then enumerated in step 3 to ensure all 
potential PMV values are properly understood to specify 
potentially hazardous systems states. Step 4 identifies the 
sensors which are responsible for generating said PMV values 
(i.e., data) to include conventional sensors, personnel, computer 
systems, etc. This step also lends insight into which feedback 
sensors are critical to monitor for potentially hazardous states 
and enforce CAs. Steps 1-4 produce a list of preliminary design 
considerations to include detailed CAs and PMVs which specify 
functional logic to inform subsystem and component 
implementation and verification.  
Step 5 of STPA-Sec design analysis is the generation of 
causal scenarios where the impact of environmental conditions 
(previously explored during conceptual analysis) are examined 
to more specifically understand and assess how losses may 
occur. Akin to tabletop red teaming, causal scenario generation 
is typically conducted by system experts, well-qualified users, 
and threat analysts with the goal of identifying plausible 
scenarios (or conditions combined with effects outside the 
system boundary) that violate or breach a constraint. In a 
general sense, this final step also serves to provide validation 
for the thoroughness of the entire STPA-Sec analysis effort. In 
this way, changes or additional constraints are often identified 
as part of the causal scenarios when attempting to ‘break’ the 
SoI. 
TABLE V: STPA-SEC DESIGN ANALYSIS.  
Step Description 
1. Develop process 
model descriptions 
Describes the decision logic (“in plain English”) 
for executing a given CA. 
2. Identify Process 
Model Variables (PMV) 
PMVs are measurable indicators of the 
conditions that trigger a CA. 
3. Specify PMV values 
PMV values are all the possible values a PMV 
can be assigned both acceptable and hazardous. 
4. Identify PMV 
sensors 
Identifies which sensors provide PMV values to 
the actors and controller for decision making. 
5. Carry out causal 
scenarios  
Brainstorm how a specific implementation of the 
system may be compromised. Identifies critical 
CAs and validates the thoroughness of the 
model, CAs, and constraints.  
VI. AUTONOMOUS RESUPPPLY SPACE VEHICLE CASE STUDY 
In this section, we provide a simplified case study 
highlighting STPA-Sec’s utility for eliciting and defining safety, 
security, and resiliency requirements, as well as, specifying 
design and implementation criteria which can be formally 
verified. This section demonstrates STPA-Sec’s high-level flow 
and outputs, and is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis 
(additional examples available here [46]). This case study was 
initially conducted as an ad hoc working group consisting of 
engineers, operators, and mission owners, the details of which 
have been obfuscated by discussing a notional autonomous 
resupply space vehicle (i.e., a complex cyber-physical system). 
Additionally, this discussion extends a recent satellite STPA 
analysis performed by Thomas [65].  
Iterative analysis of STPA-Sec’s various phases is 
encouraged and somewhat limited to the expertise and skillset 
of those generating the scenarios. It is highly recommended to 
 
 
generate these scenarios with expertise from system operators, 
SME’s, and with those familiar with likely threats because 
STPA-Sec asks operators and SMEs context-specific, direct 
questions rather than general, ambiguous questions. For 
example, an operator might be asked why they might activate 
an ABORT command for the loss of communications with the 
vehicle (or perhaps better yet, how long would they reasonably 
wait before they activated the ABORT command if 
communication had been lost).  Perhaps more importantly, the 
very inclusion of the ABORT functionality can be discussed 
and presented as a security trade before the functionality is 
designed into the architecture. Hypothetically, the ABORT 
command might be used to terminate the mission and return the 
vehicle to earth before resupply had been completed. The 
functionality might be included to prevent damage to the 
vehicle or ISS in the case of communications loss. However, 
the functionality might also be used by an attacker to cause 
mission failure. Through early discussions with operators and 
stakeholders, alternative means might be devised to ensure the 
safety of the vehicle in the case of a loss of communications. 
The approach described is fundamentally different than current 
security approaches that would focus on assuring the 
functionality after it was already included in the architecture. 
STPA-Sec facilitates a discussion on whether or not particular 
functionality should be included and allows an early 
assessment as to the degree engineers believe the functionality 
can be assured. Obviously, if functionality costs more to secure 
than it adds to mission completion, serious consideration 
should be given to not including (instantiating) the 
functionality into the architecture. 
Obviously, not every scenario can be imagined, but the 
STPA-Sec produces a set of hazardous scenarios that will lead 
to the unacceptable losses if they occur under the worst case 
environmental conditions (that are beyond the ability of the 
engineering team to control). Operator insights are used to 
develop and improve the architecture. The top-down approach 
ensures that operators and SMEs only focus on scenarios that 
lead to losses of interest to stakeholders. The approach is also 
much more focused than simply asking operators, “what might 
go wrong.”  Not every adverse situation will lead to a loss that 
stakeholders care about. Proposing solutions to a security 
problem that does not concern the key stakeholders adds 
unnecessary cost and complexity to the system. 
A. Concept Analysis Phase 
To begin the analysis, we first clarified and documented the 
system’s intended mission by defining the system’s purpose and 
goal with several key stakeholders. High-level documentation 
such as ConOps, OpCons, gap analysis, mission needs 
statements, and any use cases are reviewed with data parsed into 
the framework depicted below. This phase is essential for 
properly understanding the scope of the security problem (i.e., 
context) while simultaneously not over limiting the solution 
space. For example, from a holistic systems perspective 
technical and procedural security solutions should be equally 
considered. 
A system to do (what): Autonomously resupply the                                         
International Space Station (ISS) 
By means of (how): Launching, Flying proper trajectories, 
docking, and returning to Earth 
In order to (why): Maintain operations on the ISS in a 
cost-effective manner while minimizing risk to astronauts  
 
Next, we considered any unacceptable losses with respect to 
the stated system’s mission. Initial stakeholder discussions 
(facilitated by the initial mission statement) resulted in a 
number of lower level losses which were consolidated into a 
list of three high-level unacceptable losses. While the list can 
be more or less detailed, three losses satisfies our needs to 
ensure they were sufficiently different: 
1. Loss or significant damage to Vehicle or ISS 
2. Loss of vehicle cargo 
3. Death or Injury to astronauts 
The third step includes identifying hazards which may 
contribute to or result in these unacceptable losses. This is done 
by considering the functionality necessary for the completion 
of the mission (in this case: Launch, Flight, Docking and 
Return). Hazards can contribute to multiple losses, but must 
contribute to at least one unacceptable loss. The goal at this 
point is not to identify every possible undesirable outcome. For 
instance, temporary losses of communication with the vehicle 
are undesirable, however, at this point we are focusing only on 
hazards that can lead to outcomes that stakeholders have 
agreed are unacceptable and must be mitigated (such as loss of 
the cargo). 
Another important point is that all the hazards must be 
under the control of the systems engineers designing the 
system. Space weather would not be considered a hazard, 
however, the system exceeding operating temperature 
tolerances (such as might occur from space weather) would be 
a hazard requiring engineers to design a suitable environmental 
control system. Detailed causal scenarios such as space 
weather extremes are handled later in the scenario development 
phase (as are generic cyber attacks). Likewise, operator error is 
not a hazard per se, but operator failure to issue a docking 
command when required would be a detailed causal scenario. 
Like maintaining adequate environmental control onboard the 
vehicle, the focus is maintaining desired functionality (i.e., an 
operator issuing proper commands under the proper 
conditions). 
Table VI lists a high-level set of hazards for the example. 
scenario. This is done in a simple table with the losses listed 
across the top and potential hazards along the left-hand side. 
The preliminary analysis is not complete at this point. Early 
systems engineering analysis and conceptual design should 
focus on functionality not the particular form the architecture 
will take. One limitation of “baking in” cyber security has been 
the dependence on having detailed information about the 
particular “form” or architecture under consideration (e.g 
Operating systems). STPA-Sec enables security analysis 
without such detailed information. In the simplified example, 
 
 
the basic functionality the resupply vehicle requires to 
complete the mission was specified during the initial phase of 
the analysis. The vehicle must have functionality to launch, fly 
trajectory, dock, and return. Instantiating this functionality in a 
vehicle that is secure and resilient is the ultimate goal of the 
security engineering effort. 
 
 
TABLE VI: HAZARDS AND LOSSES MAPPING. 
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H1: Failure to Maintain Safe Separation 
between ISS and Vehicle 
X X  
H2: Exceed Safe Closure rate between 
vehicle and ISS 
X X  
H3: Payload Environment not maintained 
within limits 
  X 
B. Architectural Analysis Phase 
Figure 3 depicts a high-level functional control structure 
that engineers can use to better define and reason about how 
the set of 4 basic functionalities can be assured, meaning that 
their behavior can be bounded within acceptable limits. The 
simple block diagram consists of a ground system, an 
automated control and data handling system aboard the vehicle, 
an environmental system, a movement control system, and 
“other subsystems.”  We previously determined that one of the 
unacceptable losses is damage to the vehicle and/or ISS. A 
hazard under the control of the designers is exceeding the safe 
closure rate between the vehicle and the ISS during docking 
(one of the high-level functions). The closure rate might occur 
accidentally or it might occur as the result of a cyber attack on 
some part of the system. However, an early but critical design 
choice is how the docking functionality will be implemented.  
The functional structure represents two different 
architectures (with one potentially easier to assure against 
disruptions than the other). Perhaps locking out the ground 
segment from providing commands during the docking 
maneuver might be advisable. If such separation were desired, 
then any C2 attacks on the ground segment would not disrupt 
the docking functionality. However, severing C2 with the 
ground segment during the docking process eliminates the 
possibility of ground controller intervention if an unexpected 
situation arises. Security and resilience are not the only 
architectural trades impacting the connectivity of the ISS, 
ground segment, and the vehicle. Cost and complexity are also 
factors. Inclusion of only two of the three might reduce cost 
and complexity. Likewise, perhaps the ground only requires an 
ABORT function. The point is not to decide these factors 
solely on the basis of the STPA-Sec analysis, but the analysis, 
as it proceeds, enables and facilitates a security discussion 
during the early trades where the key decisions are made 
instead of asking security engineers to “secure” an architecture 
that may be unsecureable. 
Figure 4 decomposes the initial depiction in Figure 3 to 
facilitate deeper analysis. The simplified example now turns to 
increasing understanding on how particular hazards can be 
mitigated in the design to follow and the requirements for 
achieving this end. Mitigating H2 is examined in more detail. 
Closure rate and position are controlled by the maneuver 
control system. The engineering challenge is defining a 
functional structure that will maintain closure rates within 
desired limits.  
Figure 4 further decomposes the functionality into a control 
loop model consisting of the sensing functions, the controlling 
functions, and the thruster or actuation functions. The STPA-
Sec analysis provides a verifiable set of commands (or CAs) 
necessary to perform all mission functions. In a complete 
STPA-Sec analysis, a full enumeration of controls actions 
required for each basic functionality (launching, flying, 
docking, and returning) would be captured. In this example for 
brevity we have selected a single CA for further analysis. For 
docking, the CA list would include an INCREASE THRUST 
command. The INCREASE THRUST command is necessary 
to perform the docking process, however, if applied the wrong 
time (or continued too long) it can create H2. The next portion 
of the analysis identifies the context under which issuing the 
INCREASE THRUST command might create a hazard or 
situation where failure to issue the command creates a hazard. 
This analysis is accomplished through the Control Action 
Analysis Table, Table VII. 
 
 
 
FIG 3. HIGH LEVEL STRUCTURE WITH ISS CONTROL OF DOCKING. FROM [63]. 
 
FIG 4. REFINED CONTROL STRUCTURE. FROM [63]. 
If an attacker wishing to damage the ISS or vehicle was 
somehow able to issue the INCREASE THRUST command 
when the vehicle was already at max desirable speed or when 
the vehicle was in close proximity to the station, a hazardous 
situation (H1 or H2) develops. The hazardous situation does 
not necessarily mean a loss will occur, but the hazardous 
situation is a necessary precondition for the loss to occur. Thus, 
if the functionality can be controlled within the desired limits 
in the face of intentional and unintentional disruptions, then a 
case can be made for the system’s resilience and security. 
Issuing the INCREASE THRUST command when the vehicle 
is at max acceptable speed in close proximity to the ISS places 
the system in a hazardous state. The CA analysis table is the 
culminating product of the architecture analysis capturing 
critical analysis for informing the system design further 
explored in the design analysis phase of STPA-Sec. 
 TABLE VII: STPA-SEC CONTROL ACTION (CA) ANALYSIS. 
Control 
Action 
Not 
providing 
causes 
Hazard 
Providing 
Causes 
Hazard 
Too Early/too 
late, wrong 
order 
Stopping too 
soon/applying 
too long 
Increase 
Thrust  
CA-ACS-# 
1a: Not 
providing 
INCREASE 
THRUST 
command is 
hazardous if 
thrust is 
required to 
slow closure 
rate to safe 
speed [ H-1, 
H-2] 
CA-ACS-# 1b: 
Providing 
INCREASE 
THRUST 
command is 
hazardous if 
already at max 
speed or when 
in close 
proximity to 
the ISS        
[H-1, H-2] 
CA-ACS-# 1c:  
Providing 
INCREASE 
THRUST 
command too 
late is 
hazardous if 
already at max 
speed or when 
in close 
proximity to the 
ISS [ H-1, H-2] 
CA-ACS-# 1d:  
Providing 
INCREASE 
THRUST 
command too 
long is 
hazardous if 
already at max 
speed or when 
in close 
proximity to 
the ISS [ H-1, 
H-2] 
 
C. Design Analysis Phase (With a Focus on Causal Scenarios) 
In the design phase, steps 1-4, seek to understand why and 
how a particular command (or CA) might be issued. This is 
done through consideration of the process model description, 
PMV, and acceptable PMV values. This allows developers and 
security specialists to specify an acceptable range of PMV 
values which can be formally modelled and tested as desired. 
For example, if the space vehicle’s thrust is the PMV, 
acceptable values may range from 10-50 km/s. In order to 
comprehensively specify and secure the SoI’s behavior 
(functionality) PMVs and their acceptable values need to be 
captured for each system’s function and respective CAs. 
Lastly, in step 5, we introduce four high-level causal 
scenarios. The first scenario is that the Attitude Control thrust 
system might apply thrust when it is not required based on 
missing, faulty or incomplete feedback. The second scenario is 
that the Attitude Control System might receive the proper 
feedback information on current speed, but might have an 
internal logic error in either interpreting the input data to 
determine the actual state or issuing the wrong command based 
on the correct state. The third high-level scenario is that the 
thruster might issue the incorrect amount of thrust based on 
input from the ACS. The fourth scenario involves some type of 
component failure (stuck or broken nozzle). 
It is important to note that each of the high level scenarios 
can be decomposed further as the design continues and 
architectural decisions are made. Based on the abbreviated 
discussion, designers might decide to include a mechanical 
backup to the onboard vehicle autonomy. The early analysis 
highlights where the early weight of security engineering effort 
should be focused. The system’s positioning and environmental 
control functionality have significant impact. At a functional 
level (i.e., independent of a particular physical solution), 
security and resiliency requirements can be defined for each 
hazard. For example, to prevent operator error, additional 
engineering considerations should be incorporated into the 
desired system, operational procedures, and training programs. 
Likewise, the identification of critical information (and 
information processing) may necessitate additional redundancy 
costs. Note, this is done at a functional level without a specific 
architecture. Thus, while this workshop was conducted with a 
specific system in mind, the results are generally applicable to 
types (or categories) of systems, defense related or not. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This work addresses the gap in systems security engineering 
and analysis approaches for the development of secure systems 
by suggesting a simple, yet clear means for specifying 
measurable and verifiable security design requirements. 
Moreover, the suggested approach is tailorable with three levels 
of details, all of which provide traceability to the system 
owner’s needs. The utility of STPA-Sec systems security 
analysis approach is demonstrated with an autonomous resupply 
space vehicle example which elevates the security problem from 
guarding the SoI against potential attack paths to the higher-
level systems problem of assuring the SoI’s critical functions. 
Moreover, this approach makes the security problem readily 
understandable and is mapped to standardized systems security 
engineering processes as described in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and 
NIST 800-160.  
In particular, this work seeks to improve the science of 
systems security engineering with a focus on understanding and 
 
 
defining security requirements. Future work includes 
completing a detailed study of a next-generation military 
refueling system to assess the utility of STPA-Sec for 
conceptual analysis of complex military systems to include a 
means for eliciting cyber resiliency requirements. Ultimately, 
continued research in this field enables more secure and 
defensible systems to be fielded. 
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example of STPA-Sec by studying a notional next generation aerial refueling platform, 
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for United States Department of Defense Major Weapon Systems.  
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ABSTRACT In today’s highly interconnected and technology-reliant environment, cybersecurity is rapidly 
growing in importance. Cybersecurity is no longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks, 
as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical systems such as 
automobiles and airplanes. While numerous vulnerability analysis and architecture analysis approaches are 
in use, these approaches are often focused on realized systems with limited solution space. An effective 
approach to understand security and resiliency requirements early in the system acquisition cycle is needed. 
One such approach, System Theory Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec), addresses the cyber-
physical security problem from a systems viewpoint at the conceptual level early in the program when the 
solution trade-space is largest rather than merely examining components and adding protections in 
production and sustainment. This work provides a detailed and independent evaluation of STPA-Sec’s 
utility for eliciting, defining, and understanding security and resiliency requirements for advanced cyber-
physical systems. This work uniquely offers a complete and thorough example of STPA-Sec by studying a 
notional next generation aerial refueling platform, and demonstrates STPA-Sec’s utility to perform 
conceptual systems security analysis for United States Department of Defense Major Weapon Systems. 
INDEX TERMS Conceptual Analysis, Cybersecurity, Security, Security Engineering, Security 
Requirements, STPA-Sec, Systems Engineering, Systems Security Engineering 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s highly interconnected and technology reliant 
environment, systems security is rapidly growing in 
importance. As the Internet of Things continues to grow, the 
centrality of cyber-physical devices to modern life is 
increasingly important. Thus, security (and safety) is now an 
emergent property of cyber-physical systems, where their 
software and real-time networks require continuous 
interaction [1]. The cyber threat is one of the most serious 
economic and national security challenges we face as a 
nation; America's economic prosperity in the 21st century 
depends on cybersecurity [2]. 
In light of growing cyber threats, the United States 
Department of Defense (U. S. DoD) has made recent changes 
to expand traditional IT-focused security approaches and 
mandate security assessments for major weapon systems 
(MWS) [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. These policies dictate that 
acquisition programs integrate security efforts into existing 
systems engineering processes, and work to ensure security 
considerations hold equal footing with other requirements 
and design trade-offs at major program reviews. Although, 
these DoD mandates are in place, a well-received streamlined 
executable approach for MWS cybersecurity analysis is yet 
to be defined.  
The challenge of cybersecurity is a “wicked problem” 
where the problem is twofold: first the problem itself must be 
defined. Then the solution or actions required to get from 
as-is to to-be must be determined. Specific to security, it is 
trying to secure systems via an unknown solution and 
defending against an unknown evolving threat. Nested, 
interactive complexity and the socio-technical aspects make 
cybersecurity a wicked problem [9]. 
Traditional security approaches are typically conducted 
at a component level and the results aggregated together into 
a system analysis. This analysis fails to capture emergent 
properties of the system that arise from complex interactions. 
This research addresses these problems through executing a 
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conceptual security analysis in a case study of interest to the 
USAF. 
This paper has three main goals: First, it provides a 
complete and thorough example of STPA-Sec for a 
complex aerial refueling system. Second, it offers initial 
tips and recommendations for future practitioners. Third it 
demonstrates the utility of STPA-Sec for complex MWS 
security analysis. 
This work presents a background of STPA-Sec in Section 
II. Section III provides an introduction to the case study and 
presents a tailored STPA-Sec approach. Sections IV-VI 
detail the steps and analysis performed for each phase of an 
STPA-Sec analysis. First the purpose of the phase will be 
introduced, followed by a description of the steps. The case 
study example is presented along with rationale to assist a 
practitioner in accomplishing an STPA-Sec analysis for their 
complex SoI. Section VII provides an assessment of STPA-
Sec’s utility, and section VIII provides a brief summary and 
conclusion.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
System Theoretic Process Analysis, STPA-Sec, is a 
promising methodology for performing secure systems or 
security analysis. STPA-Sec applies a systems engineering 
approach providing engineers the largest trade space for 
developing secure solutions. STPA-Sec elevates the security 
problem from guarding the system against all potential attack 
paths to the higher-level problem of assuring the system’s 
critical functions. Because STPA is a top-down, system 
engineering approach to system safety and security, it can be 
used early in the system development process to generate 
high-level safety and security requirements and constraints. 
These high-level requirements can be refined using STPA to 
guide the system design process and generate detailed safety 
and security requirements for individual components [10].  
STPA-Sec is an extension of Nancy Levinson’s systems 
safety work: STPA and System Theoretic Accident Model 
and Process (STAMP) [11]. This work has been well 
received within the safety and systems engineering 
community [12]. It is founded on systems theory, analyzing 
the system as a whole rather than a sum of the parts to 
capture emergent properties common in complex systems. It 
asserts safety and security are emergent properties resulting 
from relationships among the parts of the system. STAMP 
and STPA define the safety problem as a control problem 
and leverage control theory to design an effective control 
structure that reduces or eliminates adverse events [13].  
STPA-Sec is an extension of this methodology from the 
safety domain to security and has been shown to effectively 
address security through the dissertation work of its founder, 
Colonel William Young [14]. STPA-Sec has demonstrated 
promise for facilitating early security and resiliency 
requirements generation with traceability to stakeholder 
prioritized safety and security needs. STPA-Sec has proved 
its utility for cybersecurity in the defense industry and the 
DoD. The DoD has adopted STPA-Sec as Functional 
Mission Analysis for Cyber, FMA-C. FMA-C is a version of 
STPA-Sec owned by the USAF and has been tailored to meet 
the USAF mission need [15]. FMA-C is being taught to 
thousands of airmen in an effort to assure critical cyber 
systems and reduce vulnerabilities. While the structure and 
content of FMA-C is very similar to STPA-Sec, its 
application has been tailored to As-Is Information 
Technology infrastructure. In practice, USAF Mission 
Defense Teams apply FMA-C on fielded cyber systems to 
identify mission critical vulnerabilities. The practical 
application of FMA-C to IT central systems has scoped its 
focus to this mission need. STPA-Sec, specifically in the 
tailored approach presented in this paper, enables analysis of 
a conceptual MWS prior to a design solution. It elevates the 
analysis to highest level employing systems engineering 
through systems theory focused on complex interactions in 
cyber physical systems.  
While John Thomas and Nancy Leveson’s STPA primer 
[10] is an excellent resource for instructions on implementing 
STPA, its chapter for STPA-Sec has not yet been released. 
Of the STPA-Sec analyses completed to date, most are either 
simplified for presentation purposes or limited distribution 
due to sensitive and proprietary system information. This 
work seeks to provide an academic but relevant and complete 
example (includes all phases and steps of STPA-Sec) to 
promote utility and enable greater understanding for future 
practitioners. 
 
III. TAILORED STPA-SEC APPROACH 
This work details a tailored STPA-Sec approach as 
performed for a high level case study analysis of a notional 
next generation refueling military aircraft, titled the KC-X. 
The data used to conduct this case study is sourced from 
publically available acquisition documentation prepared by 
the United States Air Force, USAF, for the next generation 
tanker, KC-X [16] [17] and supplemented by the authors as 
required. The documentation is written prior to selecting a 
contractor or finalizing a design. It includes the following 
information:  First, an overview of the operational scope 
required with a mapping to joint service requirements is 
presented. Next, an overview of the intended mission and 
required capabilities is presented. System activities, required 
functions, and other needs are listed. Finally draft 
performance parameters are presented for evaluation of 
materiel solutions. Mission specific details have been 
obfuscated and generalized for widest distribution. 
A tailored approach of STPA-Sec was first presented in the 
authors’ previous work [18].  This approach is composed of 
three levels (phases) of analysis: conceptual, architecture, and 
design as depicted in figure 1. The overall tailored STPA-Sec 
approach begins at the highest level of abstraction with 
concept analysis, focused on elaboration of the system 
purpose and goal. Next, it descends into architecture analysis 
of the system from a functional level. Finally, potential forms 
of the system are considered and analyzed in the design 
analysis steps. A detailed explanation of each phase and step 
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of this approach is presented along with the case study results 
and recommendations in sections IV-VI.   
STPA-Sec is not intended to be implemented as a checklist 
approach; it should be iterative both within each phase and in 
progression to lower levels of detail providing verification 
and validation.  Refinement to previous steps is expected and 
encouraged throughout the analysis.   
 
IV. CONCEPT ANALYSIS 
 As shown in Table II, the four conceptually-oriented 
STPA-Sec steps begin with mission-level analysis to prevent 
the system from entering hazardous system states that could 
lead to unacceptable losses and mission failure. Beginning 
systems security analysis at the mission-level allows 
security engineers to more accurately understand the 
stakeholders’ needs and maximizes the engineering trade 
space as system goals are transformed into constraints (i.e., 
early safety, security, and resiliency requirements).  
TABLE II: STPA-SEC CONCEPT ANALYSIS. 
Step Description 
1. Define the SoI’s 
purpose and goal 
Capture the mission statement and key activities 
of the system: 
    1) A system to: (What) 
    2) By Means of: (How) 
    3) In Order to: (Why) 
2. Identify unacceptable 
losses 
Define high level, intolerable system outcomes 
to key stakeholders (e.g., loss of life, injury, 
damage to equipment, reputation, mission, etc.).  
3. Identify hazards 
Identify system states that when coupled with 
worst case conditions lead to an unacceptable 
loss. 
4. Develop system 
security constraints 
Develop mission-informed security constraints 
that prevent the system from entering hazardous 
states. These constraints are synonymous with 
early safety, security, and resiliency functional 
requirements. 
 
 
1. Purpose and Goal 
The first step of STPA-Sec defines the SoI’s mission in terms 
of a purpose and goal from the stakeholders’ perspective. 
Stakeholder involvement is extremely important to an 
accurate mission statement. For a military environment, the 
mission commander is the ideal person to provide this input 
with support from his key staff. STPA-Sec’s purpose and 
goal is very strategic and the exact word choices dictate 
future analysis steps.  
The format of the mission statement is standardized into 
three parts: 1) A system to 2) by means of 3) in order to. The 
purpose and goal for the KC-X example are shown in table 
III. The first phrase “A system to” is meant to capture the 
primary purpose of the system (i.e., the What) in a few 
words. For the KC-X, since input directly from the mission 
commander was not available, the authors distilled pages 
worth of mission information from other documentation into 
a short concise statement, provide worldwide aerial refueling. 
This statement was directly captured from the source 
documentation ‘mission statement’, but paired down from 
the documentation version. It included a specification to 
refuel both US and coalition aircraft at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels. For an STPA-Sec analysis it 
is beneficial to capture the core of the mission in as few 
words as necessary. 
 The second portion of the purpose and goal, “by means 
of”, identifies the key activities or processes the system uses 
to achieve its purpose (i.e., the How). This is often the most 
difficult step as the verbs chosen here become the controlled 
processes further analyzed in architectural and design 
analysis. For the KC-X and complex systems in general, 
narrowing down to a small set of verbs to cover the broad 
spectrum of key activities is not an easy task. In this case an 
OV-5 was available, but its organization did not lead to direct 
plug and chug of mission activity summary tasks. The OV-5 
grouped activities by ground and air, so it required 
reorganization into functional groupings in an effort to roll 
up the 20 some functions into 3 high-level activities. STPA-
Sec does not specify how many key activities is appropriate, 
but it would be difficult to conduct the analysis with 20 key 
activities and likely would be very repetitive. Based on a 
functional grouping of the activities presented in the OV-5, 
the key activities for the KC-X are: Flying, Refueling, and 
Mission Planning. These high level, yet simple and practical 
functional activities rolled up tasks in the OV-5 such as take-
off, navigate en-route, and participate in MSN networks into 
a more useful and paired down set of key activities. There 
was some debate over mission planning, but it was included 
since this is a security based analysis. Additionally, in the 
context of known attack surfaces, we determined the activity 
of mission planning, which is highly reliant on computer 
systems and data from external sources, should be included 
as a key activity for this analysis. 
Lastly, the “in order to” identifies the goal, or what 
mission the system contributes to (i.e., the Why). Capturing 
FIGURE 1 TAILORED STPA-SEC OVERVIEW. 
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the mission the system supports sounds easy but is often 
difficult in practice as it is difficult to determine the correct 
level of mission the system supports. It can be an easy trap to 
say, ‘enables the Air Force mission’, or ‘supports the 
warfighter’, but these statements lack appropriate specificity. 
For the KC-X, a down select occurred between: fulfilling the 
national defense strategy, meeting the quadrennial defense 
review, achieving the Joint Capability Areas, and prosecuting 
the USAF’s 7 warfighting missions. The decision was made 
to combine the most relevant of the above in a coherent goal 
focused on the AF mission decomposed into the specific 
primary missions enabled through the KC-X system. 
Accurately defining the desired system’s purpose and 
goal can be challenging. Best results are produced with 
involvement from key stakeholders such as mission 
owner(s), operators, and users. Moreover, correctly defining 
the mission (or business case) provides a baseline for 
prioritizing and performing security tradeoffs within an 
operationally-focused paradigm.  
 
TABLE III: KC-X PURPOSE AND GOAL. 
Purpose A System to  Provide worldwide aerial refueling 
Method By Means of  Flying, Refueling, and Mission Planning 
Goal In order to  
Enable the Air Force Mission to meet 
Joint Capability Areas via refueling and 
airlift: Force Enable, Force Extend, Force 
Multiply 
 
2. Unacceptable Losses 
The second step of STPA-Sec identifies unacceptable 
losses. An unacceptable loss is a specific, unacceptable 
outcome as defined by mission and system owners (i.e., the 
key stakeholders). Unacceptable losses should be rolled up 
to the highest level. The system losses should identify what 
is of utmost value to the stakeholders differentiating from 
what is nice to have/desired. Unacceptable losses can be 
mission, personnel, or equipment loss; common 
unacceptable losses include loss of life and loss of mission 
essential equipment. However, losses are not just limited to 
these, loss of reputation or loss of critical data are examples 
of unacceptable losses that can be addressed through STPA-
Sec. To determine unacceptable losses, any outcome that a 
stakeholder is concerned about should be identified and 
documented. Then those losses can be re-examined and 
grouped together or rolled up into the highest level of losses.  
Unacceptable Losses 
L1: Death or Human injury 
L2: Damage to or loss of aircraft 
L3: Unable to Complete Primary Mission(s) 
 
 For the KC-X example, the losses identified are shown 
above. In the author’s review of other STPA work these 
were common unacceptable losses shared across other 
analyses for complex systems [18]. While an STPA or 
STPA-Sec analysis is not limited to these three losses, the 
three identified here should be applicable to many complex 
systems. More specifically, these losses can be generalized 
such that they are not aircraft or even military specific with 
slight modifications. L1 is broadly applicable and more 
generally corresponds to high value asset or operator loss, 
L2 more generally is the system of interest (SoI) loss, and 
L3 accounts for functional losses. As a note, since this is a 
military system, in wartime, L2 may be loosened to allow 
for a certain number of airframes or a certain amount of 
damage to become acceptable to ensure the mission can be 
completed in contended airspace.  
Given the importance of unacceptable losses to the 
mission system and stakeholders, unacceptable losses  
provide critical information to follow on STPA-Sec steps,  
resulting in requirements for safety, survivability, and 
security that are traced back to prevention of these losses.   
3. Hazards 
The third step identifies hazards that can contribute to cause 
an unacceptable loss. STPA defines a hazard as a system 
state (or set of conditions) that together with a worst-case set 
of environmental conditions will lead to an unacceptable loss 
[10]. Environmental conditions can be events such as 
weather but are defined as any condition impacting the 
system that is outside of the system boundary (conditions the 
system has no control over).  
The hazards identified should be within the system 
boundary and not themselves an environmental condition or 
external actor. A hazard for an aircraft is not a mountain or 
weather because the designer of the aircraft has no control 
over the weather or the location of a mountain. Instead the 
hazard may be the aircraft getting too close to the mountain 
or the aircraft being in an area of bad weather. For an STPA-
Sec analysis the hazard is written as violation of 
altitude/clearance from terrain (H2). The resulting hazard 
could be exasperated by many environmental conditions: 
weather, turbulence, improper ATC guidance, loss of 
navigation, ect. For all these conditions, the hazard as 
written is still valid and system design choices can be 
selected to mitigate a larger set of potentially unsafe 
scenarios (leading to unacceptable losses), thus covering a 
broad scope of identified and unidentified environmental 
conditions. An example of a design choice informed by this 
hazard is purposefully designing a redundant altimeter 
system informed by multiple sources of altitude, including 
radar. This design choice would likely prevent the collision 
with the mountain (unacceptable loss) independent of which 
environmental condition put the aircraft on a collision 
course.  
For the KC-X example, four hazards are identified in 
table IV. Specific emphasis was placed on writing them 
independent of environmental conditions. Hazards 1 and 2 
are written to scope broad groups of likely environmental 
challenges the aircraft will encounter (weather, improper 
navigation, turbulence, pilot error) into controllable 
activities that combined with these worst case environmental 
conditions would likely result in a loss. Hazard 3 is included 
to capture the hazardous potential of a poorly designed radar 
warning or equivalent system in an effort to stress the 
importance of design tradeoffs for system survivability. 
Hazard 4 could arguably be omitted, but was retained to 
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emphasize the importance of reliability and security for 
those systems deemed mission critical (i.e. the flight 
management system or refueling control subsystem). 
 
TABLE IV: KC-X HAZARDS. 
 
Hazard to Loss 
Cross Walk Table 
L1                    
Death 
or 
Human 
injury 
L2           
Damage 
to or loss 
of 
aircraft 
L3                                                                              
Unable to 
Complete  
Mission(s) 
H1 
Flying to Close too 
other aircraft/out of 
position 
X X X 
H2 
Violation of 
Altitude/clearance 
from terrain 
X X X 
H3 
Unable to evade 
enemy threats 
X X X 
H4 
Msn critical systems 
not functional when 
required 
  
X 
 
 As a general rule, hazards should be abstracted up to the 
highest level possible and in most cases the list of hazards 
should be fewer than 10. In practice it is often easier to 
collect a larger list of hazards and then after review the list 
can be combined to group similar hazards and roll up others 
to target a list less than 10. Identifying hazards can also 
serve to refine and clarify the list of unacceptable losses, as 
each hazard should be mapped to one or more unacceptable 
losses. Each hazard can map to one or more losses. But, if a 
hazard is not mapped to an unacceptable loss then it is either 
not a hazard or the list of unacceptable losses is incomplete 
[10]. 
Controlling hazards is STPA-Sec’s conceptual 
mechanism for delivering system cybersecurity. The 
mechanism is based on Leveson’s STAMP model that 
associates the high-level unacceptable losses as arising from 
control deficiencies across the system rather than component 
failures. The control deficiencies manifest as problems 
between components (interactions) rather than simple 
mechanical failures. The latter have been the traditional 
cause of failures in mechanical systems, but the former 
provides much more utility when developing contemporary 
large, software-intense systems. Hazardous states are a 
necessary precondition to loss. For example, if the 
unacceptable loss is two aircraft colliding, then the 
associated hazard could be generalized as failing to maintain 
safe separation between the aircraft. If safe separation is 
maintained, the two aircraft should never collide. The need 
for safe separation is identified through STPA-Sec. Ensuring 
safe separation is maintained (a control function) throughout 
operations is an engineering problem and can be addressed 
through systems engineering (secure systems engineering 
specifically). There are several different ways the violation 
might occur. The air traffic control system might be hacked 
or attacked. One or both of the aircraft might be subjected to 
a cyber-attack. Likewise, there are any number of 
mitigations that can be used to address the hazard. However, 
at this conceptual stage of the system engineering process, 
the hazardous functionality (safe separation not enforced) is 
already identified. In other words, loss prevention 
functionality (safe separation enforcement) is now identified 
and the remainder of the engineering process can focus on 
developing a suitable architecture to enforce this 
functionality. This approach allows engineers to handle 
safety and security in the same manner that all other 
emergent system properties are addressed. The systems 
approach does not preclude the need for reliable 
components. STPA-Sec still identifies scenarios involving 
component failure, but it also highlights complex, highly 
interactive scenarios involving management decisions, 
operations processes and operators. These other factors are 
also contributory to many losses. Therefore ensuring safe 
and secure operations must go beyond a focus on 
technology. 
4. Constraints 
The fourth step of the concept analysis phase is 
developing system security constraints that prevent the SoI 
from entering one of the previously identified hazardous 
states. These constraints are restrictions placed on the 
system (and implemented via the security architecture) to 
bound operation within acceptable parameters. These 
constraints are the output of the stakeholder inputs for steps 
1-3 as the measurable result of the analysis. These 
constraints inform early security requirements that are 
directly traceable to key mission needs through controlling 
the hazard and preventing its associated unacceptable 
loss(es). The constraints identified for the KC-X example 
are shown in table V. 
TABLE V: KC-X CONSTRAINTS. 
 
Constraint 
Hazard 
Mapped 
to 
1 
A/C must maintain minimum safe separation 
distance H1 
2 
Must have minimum mission critical safety 
systems functional to attempt AR H1 
3 A/C must maintain minimum safe altitude limits H2 
4 
Must have minimum mission critical safety 
systems functional for terrain flight H2 
5 
Must maintain integrity of mission critical 
warning and deterrence systems H3 
6 
Msn critical systems must be available when 
required to perform primary msn H4 
 
  In the same way hazards are mapped to losses, each 
constraint should be mapped to one or more hazard. 
Conversely each hazard should be mapped to at least one 
constraint. If a constraint cannot be created for a given 
hazard, it is likely that hazard is outside the system boundary 
and thus an environmental condition. 
Through our analysis we found most constraints mapped 
to a single hazard however some hazards had multiple 
constraints. Constraints can be simple statements re-writing 
a given hazard in the form of a restriction against operation 
in the hazardous condition. KC-X constraints 1, 3, and 6 are 
examples of this. Constraints 2 and 4 are written to restrict 
activities if mission critical safety systems are not 
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operational, and encourage redundancy and robustness of 
design for the functions deemed mission critical.  
The first four steps of STPA-Sec begin to specify 
acceptable and non-acceptable system states which can 
eventually be formally tested and verified when the 
architecture is developed. At the completion of this 
conceptual phase of analysis the list of constraints is high 
level and not necessarily security specific, applying more 
broadly to safety, security, and resiliency. As the STPA-Sec 
analysis is continued into the next phases these can and will 
be refined to further specify measurable and verifiable 
requirements for safe and secure system operation. The 
insights gained through STPA-Sec can also be used to 
inform and improve early MBSE efforts. The refined safety 
and security focused constraints provide stakeholder-
focused traceability for safety, security, and resiliency 
requirements which are important for system survivability (a 
critical issue in U.S. DoD systems [19]). 
V.  Architectural Analysis 
STPA-Sec architectural analysis is a continuation of the 
conceptual phase and examines the SoI at the functional level 
(rather than a form specific implementation as is often the 
case in cybersecurity analyses). Approaching the analysis 
from a functional rather than physical implementation 
maintains the largest trade space for potential solutions and 
helps ensure the desired system functionality can be 
implemented without unnecessary architectural and design 
constrictions. 
Table VI details the necessary steps to perform STPA-Sec 
architectural analysis. The majority of this analysis involves 
the creation of a Functional Control Structure (FCS) 
representing the SoI. The FCS can be created at various 
levels of abstraction such that an entire system is represented 
as a single model, as shown in figure 2. Or the FCS can 
decomposed into multiple sub-models, figures 4-6, used to 
more specifically understand the execution of the SoI’s key 
activities. As a reminder, the key activities were defined in 
the concept analysis phase step 1 as the verbs composing the 
method, or ‘by means of’ section of the SoI purpose and 
goal. STPA uses functional decomposition to thoroughly 
understand critical relationships between actors and 
processes represented as Control Actions (CA). After 
producing an FCS, STPA-Sec enumerates all required CAs 
followed by an analysis of their criticality, how they 
contribute to preventing the SoI from entering hazardous 
states. The output of STPA-Sec architectural analysis 
identifies potentially hazardous or unsecure CAs for a given 
system architecture. These CAs help further refine system 
level security requirements given a system architecture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE VI: STPA-SEC ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS. 
Step Description 
1. Identify Model 
Elements 
Identify actor(s), controller(s), and controlled 
process(es) for the SOI at the desired level of 
abstraction. 
2. Identify Each 
Model Elements 
Responsibilities 
Capture the description and actions planned to be 
taken for the model elements identified.  
3. Draw the FCS 
Provide a visual functional-level depiction of the 
SoI. Depicts the model elements and control 
relationships between them. 
4. Identify Control 
Actions (CA) 
Captures (in verb form) the actions necessary for 
each element to execute its responsibilities. 
5. Complete the 
Control Action 
Analysis Table  
This table systematically enumerates which 
hazards are caused by each CA identified in step 4.                                                                                            
1. Model Elements 
The first step of this phase begins populating the FCS 
with model elements. The FCS model elements include 
actors, controllers, actuators, sensors, and controlled 
processes. A standard format of an FCS is shown in figure 3. 
Starting from the bottom of the model, the controlled 
process(es) is(are) the previously identified (Concept 
Analysis Step 1) activities the system uses to achieve its 
purpose. Beginning with these “How” verb activities, the 
primary task in step 1 of STPA-Sec architectural analysis is 
identifying the controller and actors responsible for 
performing the process. Actors are the operators managing 
the process and providing inputs to the system. The 
controller is system specific, but often in high level FCS 
models is merely represented as a computer. For the KC-X 
example the actors are aircrew and the controller is the flight 
computer as shown in Figure 2.  
 
FIGURE 2 KC-X TOP LEVEL FUNCTIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURE. 
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FIGURE 3 STPA BASIC CONTROL STRUCTURE. FROM [10].  
2. Responsibilities 
Once model elements are identified, then responsibilities 
for the model elements are populated in step 2. This step 
captures the actions required of each element for executing 
the activity or controlled process. These responsibilities can 
be identified from operational or system documentation, and 
from particular discussions with users, system SME’s, and 
other stakeholders. Once a list of responsibilities is 
populated, they are assigned to the appropriate actor for each 
controlled process (or action).  
This step proved to be particularly challenging for the 
KC-X example likely due to the analysis being completed at 
the conceptual level. It was difficult to extract 
responsibilities from source documentation without 
restricting the results to a physical form implementation. In 
other words, responsibilities are often generated based on 
what that actor or controller did in the previous system. 
Most responsibilities listed were merely duty descriptions of 
crew members based on previous tanker aircraft operations. 
Utilization of these responsibilities would restrict the trade 
space of the future system. For the KC-X, the 
documentation listed a boom operator as responsible for 
accomplishing refueling and more specifically providing 
alignment cues for the receiver aircraft. While a valid 
responsibility, it assumes the KC-X solution relies on a 
human for boom operation and navigation cues. For a next 
generation platform, it is just as likely this task of navigation 
cues could be automated and performed by a computer 
system. In summary, STPA practitioners should exercise 
caution when assigning responsibilities that the solution 
space is not unnecessarily scoped down from thinking only 
how the task is currently executed. Identifying model 
element responsibilities is a key prerequisite activity to 
defining control actions in step 4 and is often revisited after 
the control actions are defined. Additionally, the 
documentation parsing effort in search of responsibilities 
may inform additional model elements as new actors or 
controllers may be discovered. 
 
3. Draw the Functional Control Structure 
The third step organizes the previously identified model 
elements into a functional control structure (i.e., a model) by 
adding control relationships. Step 1 already populated the 
model elements (boxes) for the FCS. Control relationships 
(and the FCS as a whole) depict who/what is issuing 
commands (controller), who/what is executing the 
commands (actuator), and who/what is providing feedback 
(sensor). Figure 3 illustrates these basic elements as 
previously described in step 1 and shows the basic 
relationships between them. At a high level of analysis 
organizing and depicting an FCS can seem trivial, but figure 
5 depicts the KC-X mission planning example’s more 
complex relationships. Often in complex systems multiple 
actors can issue commands to the controller, thus additional 
relationships need to be modeled. In the KC-X mission 
planning activity, both the pilot and an external mission 
planning software, i.e. JMPS, have direct inputs to the flight 
computer. The flight computer may auto-read a mission plan 
from a cartridge or the pilot may manually enter components 
of the plan. When decreasing levels of abstraction the FCS 
will become much more complex. However, the primary 
objective of creating a FCS is to manage the complexity of 
the system by accurately depicting key elements and control 
relationships.   
FIGURE 4 KC-X KEY ACTITIVY: FLY FCS
FIGURE 5 KC-X KEY ACTITIVY: MISSION PLAN FCS. 
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FIGURE 6 KC-X KEY ACTITIVY: OFFLOAD FUEL FCS. 
 
4. Control Actions (CA) 
Step 4 identifies CAs for the system. A CA is a terse 
verb (action) statement capturing the execution of a function 
(or task) necessary to control the subject process. This step 
in conjunction with the CA analysis performed in step 5 is 
some of the most important (and challenging) actions 
performed in this phase. Populating the list of CAs begins 
with pairing down the responsibilities previously identified 
in step 2 into terse action statements that an actor or 
controller performs to manage the controlled process. 
STPA-Sec is not intended to be a linear process. The 
nonlinearity of effort is evidenced for the KC-X while trying 
to accomplish this step and step 2 (responsibilities). The 
primary challenge is determining what level of abstraction is 
appropriate for the CAs as CAs exist at many levels of 
abstraction. The level of abstraction should be dictated by 
the overall level of detail for the analysis.  
CAs should be identified for each activity, thus each 
FCS. The CA’s identified for the KC-X example are shown 
in table VII. This step proved to be the most difficult for the 
authors to conduct for this conceptual analysis. Many 
potential CA’s were considered, but the authors struggled to 
generate them at the highest level of abstraction.  
Specifically for the fly key activity, multiple control 
actions were considered, quickly highlighting the challenge 
of determining the correct level of abstraction. CA1 and 
CA2 for example, started from a much larger list of many 
activities required to fly (in order of decreasing level of 
abstraction): navigate route, change heading, increase bank 
angle, maneuver yoke, increase speed, increase throttle 
position setting. The list of potentially valid control actions 
for the activity fly is extensive. After brainstorming this list, 
similar activities were aggregated as much as possible and 
the three activities of Position Maintenance, Velocity 
Maintenance, and Communicate were chosen to capture the 
much larger subset of potential control actions. For an 
analysis of a preliminary system design it may be more 
appropriate to capture the CAs at a lower level of abstraction 
and thus a much longer list, but for this example, the highest 
level of abstraction was chosen. The mission plan FCS had 
many potential tasks under consideration for the control 
action. CAs 7 and 8 demonstrate the link between control 
actions and responsibilities. Responsibilities identified 
through parsing documentation are present in the description 
section of the control action list. While not exhaustive of all 
potential tasks and responsibilities, it provides a good 
description of efforts executed in the Mission Plan FCS. For 
this FCS the authors chose to aggregate the list of potential 
actions into the CAs: Prepare OPS and Distribute OPS.   
TABLE VII: KC-X CONTROL ACTIONS. 
Control 
Action Activity Performer Description 
1. Position 
Mx Fly 
Aircrew/ 
Computer 
Adjust position- heading 
change, takeoff, land, climb, 
descend. Computer included 
for autopilot functions 
2. Velocity 
Mx Fly 
Aircrew/ 
Computer 
Change Velocity- accelerate, 
decelerate, climb, descend. 
Computer included for 
autopilot functions 
3. 
Communicate Fly 
Aircrew/ 
Computer 
Radio and digital(i.e. 
ACARS, IFF) to other A/C , 
ATC and ground assets. 
Access and communicate in 
net centric environment. 
4. Precontact 
Offload 
Fuel 
Aircrew/ 
Computer 
Instructing both crews on 
proper position to begin AR. 
Solution independent to 
allow for human direction or 
computer aided position 
information 
5. Contact 
Offload 
Fuel 
Aircrew/ 
Computer 
Receiver connected to begin 
refueling. Solution 
Independent of human vs. 
computer to allow 
automation as desired 
6. Breakaway 
Offload 
Fuel 
Aircrew/ 
Computer 
Command to disengage either 
when complete or in case of 
emergency. Solution 
Independent of human vs. 
computer to allow 
automation as desired 
7. Prepare 
OPS 
Mission 
Plan 
Aircrew/ 
external 
mission 
planning 
system 
Reviews mission tasking, 
intel, and weather. Interacts 
with external mission 
planning system to create 
mission plan file 
8. Distribute 
OPS 
Mission 
Plan 
Aircrew/ 
Computer 
Aircrew inserts cartridge into 
jet, also provides crew 
briefings and coordination for 
mission plan. Computer 
distributes mission plan files 
to A/C systems 
 
Of significance to a conceptual STPA-Sec is the 
performer for the CAs. In the KC-X example, specific, 
sometimes painful, effort was made to remain as solution 
agnostic as possible. KC-X CAs 4-6 provide an example: in 
aerial refueling, operators are familiar with precontact, 
contact, and breakaway commands as issued by the boom 
operator. Since this analysis is for a future solution, 
specifying aircrew as the performer would limit the solution 
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space. It is feasible for a future computer controlled system 
to provide some of these CAs. Or the future KC-X may 
implement a hybrid solution with both humans and 
computers. As much as possible efforts should be made not 
to restrict the trade space of potential solutions with prior 
operation biases when conducting a conceptual analysis.  
It can be challenging to understand completeness for this 
step, but a good indicator of a sufficient CA list is when all 
the activities for a given FCS can be completed with the 
listed CAs. This becomes evident when executing causal 
scenarios (discussed in the design analysis phase step 5). If 
the scenario can be executed on the given FCS with the 
identified CAs then it’s likely the CAs listed are sufficient. 
This again demonstrates that STPA-Sec is truly nonlinear, 
and must be iterative.  
5. Control Action Analysis Table 
The bulk of STPA-Sec architectural analysis results 
reside in the fifth step – populating a CA analysis table, 
table VIII. This step requires a thorough analysis of each CA 
identified in step 4 table VII and enumerates what, if any, 
hazardous conditions can be created by the system’s actions.  
Each control action is evaluated across four scenarios. 
The first scenario asks what happens if the CA is not 
provided. In many cases this ends up being a hazardous 
scenario. This is the most likely scenario to result in a 
hazard as most CAs are designed to be executed for safe, 
secure, and efficient system operation. For the KC-X, all but 
CA5 identify potential hazards when a CA is not provided. 
CA 5s exception is discussed in the following paragraph. 
CA 1 and 2 provide an easy example of not providing a CA 
causing a hazard. If position maintenance and velocity 
maintenance, the two CAs required to execute the flying 
functions of the aircraft, are not provided and the aircraft is 
in a critical phase of flight where pilot or computer input is 
required, a hazardous scenario will result. Since an aircraft 
cannot execute its mission without performing the flying 
function, it is not surprising that not providing CA’s 1 and 2 
could result in H1, H2, and H3.  
The second scenario asks what hazards can occur if the 
CA is provided. At first this scenario may sound 
counterintuitive as one may question why CAs would exist 
that are hazardous when performed. KC-X CA 5, Contact, 
provides an example of a potential hazard when the CA is 
provided. With a combination of unsafe environmental 
conditions, most specifically the receiver out of position, it 
can be hazardous to execute the contact CA. If the CA is 
issued when the refueler or receiver aircraft is out of 
position, H1 and a resulting collision would likely occur 
resulting in a loss. 
The third scenario analyzes the result of a CA provided 
too late, too early, or out of sequence. This scenario is 
relevant for specifically timed activities where a violation of 
that timing or sequence is hazardous. For the KC-X CA 6, 
Breakaway, provides an example of this. Breakaway is 
issued during refueling when the aircraft enter an unsafe 
position. If the breakaway CA is provided too late, the 
hazard of flying too close or out of position (H1) is likely to 
occur and lead to an unacceptable loss. 
The fourth scenario analyzes if the CA is stopped too 
soon or applied too long. KC-X CA3 provides an illustration 
of a hazard for this scenario. If communication is stopped 
too soon and incomplete a hazard could reasonably occur. 
For example, if radio instructions are provided from the 
refueler to the receiver to descend and decrease speed, but 
communication is clipped before the decrease speed 
command is provided, when the maneuver begins, if only 1 
aircraft decreases speed the H1 hazard is likely to occur.  
This CA analysis table captures a multitude of 
potentially hazardous states to aid in further design criteria 
to increase the robustness of the system against these failure 
modes. This step provides refinement of early security 
constraints by informing more specific requirements to 
bound the execution of the key activities to prevent 
hazardous scenarios and their associated losses.  This data 
informs an initial “design-to” criteria which is further 
developed during STPA-Sec design analysis. However, the 
CA analysis table does not incorporate probabilities of 
occurrence. Severity is only captured in its identification of 
which system hazards are likely to be induced in that 
scenario. Further analysis beyond STPA-Sec could be 
conducted on the likelihood of the scenarios occurring and 
the expected specific consequence to assess the risk level 
and criticality of mitigations.  
The downside to the high level CA’s identified in Step 4 
is they lend themselves to less specific analysis for the CA 
Analysis Table. It also produced very similar scenario 
impacts that would likely be more diverse with a lower level 
set of CAs. The results of this effort accomplished on a 
lower level set of CAs may provide more actionable hazard 
insights to inform more specific security requirements and 
design constraints. However, conclusions are still available 
from this higher level CA analysis. For the KC-X example, 
the results of the CA analysis table illuminate the 
importance of the security and reliability of fly CAs 1-3 as 3 
out of 4 scenarios result in hazards H1-H3 and ultimately 
unacceptable losses if omitted or executed improperly. 
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TABLE VIII: KC-X CONTROL ACTION ANALYSIS TABLE.  
CA# Control Action Not providing causes Hazard 
Providing Causes 
Hazard 
Too Early/too late, wrong 
order 
Stopping too 
soon/applying too long 
EXAMPLE 
 
Not Providing CA-1 is 
Hazardous if 
(CONDITIONS) [(Hazards 
associated) H1, ect] 
   
1 
Position Mx 
(Aircrew) 
Not Providing Position MX 
is Hazardous if in a critical 
phase of flight [H1, H2, H3] 
 
Position MX is Hazardous 
if done too early or too late 
in a critical phase of flight 
[H1, H2, H3] 
Position MX is Hazardous 
if stopped to soon or 
applied to long in a critical 
phase of flight [H1, H2, 
H3] 
2 Velocity Mx 
Not Providing Velocity MX 
is Hazardous if in a critical 
phase of flight [H1, H2, H3] 
 
Velocity MX is Hazardous 
if done too early or too late 
in a critical phase of flight 
[H1, H2, H3] 
Velocity MX is Hazardous 
if stopped to soon or 
applied to long in a critical 
phase of flight [H1, H2, 
H3] 
3 Communicate 
Not Providing 
Communication is Hazardous 
if in a critical phase of 
flight(takeoff, landing, 
joining refueler) [H1, H3] 
 
Communication too late is 
Hazardous if in a critical 
phase of flight(takeoff, 
landing, joining refueler) 
[H1, H3] 
Communication stopped 
too soon (clipped 
transmission)  is 
Hazardous if in a critical 
phase of flight [H1, H3] 
4 Precontact 
Not Providing Precontact is 
Hazardous as a A/C could be 
out of position and damage 
equipment [H1,H4] 
 
The wrong sequence for 
Precontact is Hazardous if 
in a critical phase of 
refueling setup [H1,H4] 
 
5 Contact 
 
Providing Contact is 
hazardous if attempted 
during an unsafe 
position  [H1] 
Providing Contact out of 
sequence is hazardous if 
attempted during an unsafe 
position  [H1] 
 
6 Breakaway 
Not providing Breakaway is 
hazardous if unsafe position 
occurs [H1] 
 
Not providing Breakaway 
on time is hazardous if 
unsafe position occurs [H1] 
 
7 Prepare OPS 
Not providing Prepare OPS is 
hazardous in almost all 
scenarios (no planned route, 
no deconflicts, no mission 
plan loaded on systems…) 
[H1,H2,H3,H4] 
   
8 Distribute OPS 
Not providing Distribute OPS 
is hazardous in almost all 
scenarios (no filed flight 
plan, no crew briefing, no 
mission plan loaded on 
systems…) [H1,H2,H3,H4] 
Providing Distribute 
OPS is hazardous when 
malware or 
intentionally incorrect 
information is 
distributed to systems 
[H1,H2,H3,H4] 
  
 
VI. DESIGN ANALYSIS 
The STPA-Sec design analysis phase studies the 
specifics of a control action using relatively simple process 
models and scenarios. These process models enumerate the 
decision logic, key variables, and acceptable variable values 
associated with each CA in a systematic and straight 
forward fashion. Additionally, this analysis identifies which 
feedback mechanism is responsible for those process model 
variable values (e.g., a sensor or computing mechanism). 
STPA-Sec design analysis enables a more thorough  
 
 
understanding and specification for CAs which prevent the 
SoI from entering potentially hazardous and unsecure states. 
The steps of design analysis are captured in table IX. 
This phase was not fully elaborated for the KC-X 
example. The focus of this effort demonstrates utility to 
USAF warfighting systems through illustrating all STPA-
Sec steps in a case study example. When conducting a 
conceptual analysis as for the KC-X, the high level of 
abstraction chosen for CAs does not lend itself to a fully 
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elaborated design analysis. This section describes and 
illustrates the steps of design analysis but does not include 
an analysis of each control action.  
TABLE IX: STPA-SEC DESIGN ANALYSIS. 
Step Description 
1. Develop Process 
Model Descriptions 
Describes the decision logic (“in plain English”) 
for executing a given CA. 
2. Identify Process 
Model Variables 
(PMV) 
Process Model Variables are measurable 
indicators of the conditions that trigger a CA. 
3. Identify PMV Values 
PMV values are all the possible values a PMV 
can be assigned both acceptable and hazardous. 
4. Identify PMV 
Feedback 
Identifies which sensors provide PMV values to 
the actors and controller for decision making. 
5. Carry out Causal 
Scenarios  
Brainstorm how a specific implementation of the 
system may be compromised. Identifies critical 
CAs and validates the thoroughness of the 
model, CAs, and constraints.  
 
1. Process Model 
Step 1 of STPA-Sec design analysis develops process 
model descriptions. Process model descriptions describe the 
decision logic that defines how and when the controller 
executes CAs. Each process model should briefly describe 
the scenario of interest and focus on when to execute a given 
CA with details identifying the specific system elements and 
potential responses to CAs. Additionally, the process model 
should include assumptions about the controlled process. 
During this step, it is advantageous to first generate 
process model descriptions for CAs determined as 
potentially hazardous from the completed STPA-Sec 
architectural analysis (step 5 CA analysis table). This 
approach is recommended as a complex system may have a 
large (and potentially overwhelming) number of process 
model descriptions. In accordance with this 
recommendation, for the KC-X example an abbreviated set 
of CAs was chosen for design analysis to illustrate the steps. 
TABLE X: KC-X PROCESS MODEL DESCRIPTIONS. 
Control Action Key Activity 
Process Model Description / 
Decision Logic 
1. Position Mx Fly 
Execute Position Mx during 
critical phases of flight 
2. Velocity Mx Fly 
Execute Velocity Mx during 
critical phases of flight 
6. Breakaway Refuel 
Issue Breakaway when unsafe 
position 
 
2-4. Process Model Variables, Values, and Feedback 
In step 2, Process Model Variables (PMVs) are 
described as various conditions which indicate a system 
state. For the KC-X example the Breakaway CA, as shown 
in table XI, was chosen to illustrate the steps of STPA-Sec 
design analysis. Since Breakaway is issued when an unsafe 
position occurs between the refueler and receiver, an 
appropriate process model variable is separation distance. 
The discrete states a SoI could exist in are then 
enumerated in step 3 as PMV values. It is critical these 
values are properly understood to specify potentially 
hazardous systems states. For the KC-X example with 
separation distance as the process model variable, we sought 
to establish values that were simple yet enclosed the entire 
range of values. Rather than choosing a unit of distance, 
whose range could be infinite, we chose constrained values 
that informed the action: in bounds, out of bounds, and 
unknown. For the KC-X Breakaway CA, this limited set of 
distinguishable PMV values is more useful than an 
unbounded range of separation distance in feet. These allow 
for simpler discrete logic commands to be developed, (in 
bounds- do not issue CA, out of bounds- issue CA, 
unknown- issue CA). 
 Step 4 identifies the sensors which are responsible for 
generating the PMV values (i.e., data) to include 
conventional sensors, personnel, computer systems, etc. For 
the KC-X the sensors providing this feedback were an 
altimeter warning system, proximity warning system, and 
the aircrew visual cues. This step lends insight into which 
feedback sensors are critical to monitor for potentially 
hazardous states and enforce CAs. 
TABLE XI: KC-X FULL PROCESS MODEL DESCRIPTION. 
CA 
Process 
Model 
Description 
Process 
Model 
Variables 
Process 
Model 
Variable 
Values 
Feedback 
Information 
Breakaway 
Issue 
Breakaway 
when unsafe 
position 
Separation 
Distance 
In bounds, 
out of 
bounds, 
unknown 
Altimeter 
warning, 
proximity 
warning, 
eyeball 
 
Steps 1-4 produce a list of preliminary design 
considerations to include detailed process models and PMVs 
which specify functional logic.  This informs subsystem and 
component implementation as preliminary design 
specifications. 
5. Causal Scenarios 
Step 5 of STPA-Sec design analysis is the generation of 
causal scenarios where the impact of environmental 
conditions (previously explored during conceptual analysis) 
are examined to more specifically understand and assess 
how losses may occur. Akin to tabletop red teaming, causal 
scenario generation is typically conducted by system 
experts, well-qualified users, and threat analysts with the 
goal of identifying plausible scenarios (or conditions 
combined with effects outside the system boundary) that 
violate or breach a constraint.  
Figure 7 presents a tool for provoking thought in 
forming causal scenarios for an STPA-Sec analysis. 
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FIGURE 7 STPA-SEC CAUSAL SCENARIOS FROM [20].  
 
For the KC-X example, a causal scenario analysis was 
generated for the breakaway CA. Breakaway is an excellent 
example of a well-designed PMV as regardless of the 
environmental condition thought up in a causal scenario, the 
system has a robust design to respond. PMV feedback will 
indicate in bounds, out of bounds, or unknown. No matter 
the external condition, one of these states is valid and will be 
indicated. For all scenarios where the feedback assigns a 
value of out of bounds or unknown a breakaway will be 
issued. This means that turbulence, improper receiver 
position, poor refueler maneuvering, engine malfunction, 
and any other environmental causal scenarios would still not 
break this process model as designed. Even for the unknown 
scenarios, ROE's will be in place to attempt to determine the 
system state and then if still undetermined, issue the 
breakaway command. This specific example of the 
breakaway CA was chosen to illustrate a well-designed 
process model; often causal scenarios will illustrate the 
potential for an undesired impact and require rework of 
previous steps to rectify the issue. 
In a general sense, this final step serves to provide 
verification and validation for the thoroughness of the 
STPA-Sec analysis effort. In this way, changes or additional 
constraints are often identified as part of the causal scenarios 
when attempting to ‘break’ the SoI. 
VII. STPA-SEC UTILITY ASSESSMENT 
This section presents a subjective assessment of 
STPA-Sec’s utility for complex weapon systems. Table XII 
provides a summarized assessment for each phase.   
TABLE XII: STPA-SEC UTILITY ASSSESSMENT. 
 Systems Security Oriented STPA-Sec Phases 
 Concept 
Analysis 
Architectural  
Analysis 
Design  
Analysis 
Purpose 
Determine 
Security 
Requirements 
Determine 
Design-To 
Criteria 
Determine 
Build-To 
Criteria 
Difficulty Easy Moderate 
Moderate-
High 
Level of Domain 
Expertise Req’d 
Novice Advanced Expert 
Level of STPA 
Expertise Req’d 
Low High Moderate 
Amount of STPA 
instructional 
materials available 
Numerous Some Few 
Duration Hours Days Weeks 
Number of Steps 4 Steps 5 Steps 5 Steps 
 
The conceptual analysis phase provides the greatest 
return on time investment. This phase is easy to execute 
with very little STPA-Sec knowledge. Additionally, the 
most amount of STPA instructional material and examples 
are available for this effort. We recommend it is best 
accomplished in a small working group of key stakeholders. 
Establishing an agreed upon purpose and goal along with 
unacceptable losses from the key stakeholders is very 
powerful for shaping system requirements and enabling 
traceability. STPA-Sec concept analysis prevents the 
common pitfall of ‘securing the wrong thing’.  
STPA-Sec architectural analysis is more challenging and 
time consuming than conceptual analysis especially when 
 
VOLUME XX, 2018 13 
the system is decomposed to lower functional levels. The 
level of abstraction chosen for this analysis highly 
influences the time required. The functional control structure 
and list of CAs as executed for the KC-X example were kept 
at a high level, if these were decomposed to lower levels of 
abstraction, the lists of CAs and the CA analysis table could 
easily become 5-10 times its current length. While this effort 
would require more domain expertise, the additional 
information would inform more detailed design-to criteria 
while offering the STPA-Sec benefit of traceability to key 
mission activities and prevention of unacceptable losses.  
While not as clearly articulated in instructional material, the 
STPA primer and other slideshow tutorials do adequately 
address how to perform this architectural analysis.  
However, with the exception of fictionalized educational 
examples, the architectural analysis for actual systems is 
often proprietary.  As such, most real system examples 
found do not share this full analysis.  These steps often are 
the hardest to execute for the STPA-Sec novice, and the lack 
of fully detailed real world system examples adds to this 
difficulty.     
STPA-Sec design analysis is the most detailed phase of 
STPA-Sec and can require the most amount of time if each 
CA is fully elaborated via process models. The practitioner 
will require a much more robust understanding of the SoI as 
PMVs, potential PMV values, and the feedback sensors are 
often more technical than the previous analysis. However, 
this analysis pays dividends in its ability to provide early 
design specifications for components. These specifications 
are not only presented in clear decision logic, but are 
traceable back to key stakeholder mission goals. This phase 
was the least detailed for the KC-X example as the authors 
had limited system knowledge. However, the proof of 
concept was demonstrated and instructions and 
recommendations for execution were presented.  Very few 
of the STPA materials found fully detail this phase of 
execution.  While the steps are not as complex to execute as 
the architectural analysis phase, design analysis requires the 
greatest domain expertise along with the most amount of 
time investment for completion.  Additionally, the detailed 
analysis completed in this phase often drives refinements 
and changes to previous phases specifically through the 
causal scenario exercise. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This work presents a thorough case study example of an 
STPA-Sec analysis for a next generation aerial refueling 
system. This work contributes a detailed explanation of each 
step and practical tips for STPA-Sec’s execution illustrated 
through the KC-X example. The primary purpose of this 
work is not to present a breakthrough security analysis of the 
KC-X, but to provide a consolidated resource to enable the 
future practitioner to execute an STPA-Sec for their SoI. 
This work contributes a tailored approach of STPA-Sec 
to MWS, specifically USAF aircraft. While this tailored 
approach is organized into phases and steps for execution, it 
is not intended to form a checklist for security. Many 
security methods are executed in this fashion and do not 
result in highly secure systems. STPA-Sec encourages an 
iterative analysis where steps are expected to drive changes 
to previous results in an effort to further refine and specify 
security requirements.  
 STPA-Sec demonstrates utility for eliciting, defining, 
and understanding security and resiliency requirements for 
advanced cyber-physical systems. Further research could 
expand this example to incorporate SME’s from a system 
program office to increase the level of detail and evaluate the 
specific requirements generated. Additionally, alternate 
examples for other services or system types such as space 
systems could be analyzed. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions of Research 
This work is written to advance the specialty discipline of system security 
engineering and, specifically targets practitioners within the DoD and supporting 
contractors.  The first half of this work, presented in the two publications for chapters II 
and III provides a readily understandable summary of current cybersecurity architectural 
analysis approaches, and introduces a tailored approach of STPA-Sec which 
differentiates itself from other approaches in its use of systems engineering to conduct 
security analysis at a functional and conceptual level.  The second half of this work 
presented in chapter IV as a journal paper titled, “Conceptual Systems Security Analysis 
with Aerial Refueling Case Study” thoroughly describes conceptual STPA-Sec analysis 
through a case study with practical recommendations which enable systems engineers to 
conduct conceptual analyses for future complex warfighting systems.  
This section provides conclusions of this effort and demonstrates completeness 
through summaries of answers to the six research questions addressed in this thesis.  
Additionally, the significance of this research is highlighted and recommendations for 
future research are presented.  
1. What is Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis? 
Originally this question was not included as a research question since the 
definition was assumed to be available as a part of the literature survey in support of this 
work.  However, while conducting the literature review, frustratingly absent from 
published literature was a description of architecture analysis for security.  Definitions of 
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system architecture are available; there are very few definitions for architectural analysis, 
and none were in context of a security analysis. It became apparent that proposing a 
definition of cybersecurity architectural analysis was in fact a research contribution.  In 
addition to the proposed definition being tailored to the security domain, it more 
importantly highlights an emphasis on functional level analysis rather focusing solely on 
form common across the few other descriptions available of architectural analysis 
activities.  Cybersecurity architectural analysis is “the activity of discovering and 
evaluating the function and form of a system to facilitate cybersecurity decisions.” 
2. What methods exist for conducting Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis? 
Chapter II contributes the primary literature review for this work, and presents a 
consolidated introduction to complex cyber-physical system architectural analysis 
approaches. Chapter II Section III surveys ten approaches relevant for conducting 
cybersecurity architectural-level analysis on complex systems.  While literature is 
available on the approaches surveyed, no seminal work on architecture analysis for cyber, 
and none specifically relevant to complex weapon systems, was discovered.  Significant 
time and effort was invested to explore which approaches are being used in the USAF 
and DoD followed by the collection and review of available documentation.  This 
included attending training courses, conferences, and reviewing published analysis 
results.   
3. What are the key characteristics for Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis and how do 
they map to current approaches for complex cyber-physical systems? 
In Chapter II Section IV distinguishing characteristics for cybersecurity 
architectural analysis approaches are presented.  These characteristics include: bottom-up 
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vs top down approach, threat driven analysis, vulnerability based analysis, MBSE 
enabled (used an integrated architecture), and if a software tool was required.  These 
characteristics are determined through detailed literature review, proposal of the 
definition, and the review of each approach’s published documentation, instructional 
materials, and system examples available. At the end of Section IV, Table I presents a 
consolidated mapping of approaches to characteristics as a simplified resource to assist 
the security practitioner in understanding the surveyed approaches.  
TABLE I: ARCHITECTURAL APPROACHES TO CHARACTERISTICS MAPPING. 
 Top 
Down 
Bottom 
Up 
Threat 
Driven 
Vul. 
Based 
MBSE 
Integrated 
MBSE 
Executable  
Tool 
Based 
DoDAF + 
Richards 
X1   X X X4 X 
CRAF X
1  X X X X X 
UAF 
Security 
X   X X X4 X 
ACVAM  X X X    
STPA-Sec X
2   X    
RMF  X5 X X X3   
1. Promotes a top-down approach after mission functions are identified (i.e., 
does not include mission thread analysis). 
2. Approach begins at a higher level than other approaches examined (i.e., 
includes mission thread analysis) and includes lower level analysis. 
3. Suggests using MBSE, but not required and often not considered. 
4. Would require pairing with additional modeling & simulation plugin. 
5. RMF is intended to be a top-down approach but is often applied bottom-up 
using security control compliance based on system type. 
 
4. How can STPA-Sec be tailored to enable the development of security requirements 
and design criteria? 
This question is answered first in Chapter III Section V with the description of a 
tailored three phase STPA-Sec approach.  Of note, this work is not taking credit for the 
development of STPA-Sec, as it was developed by Dr. William Young [1], but 
re-organizes the steps and separated the overall execution into conceptual, architectural, 
and design phases to increase the utility and usability of STPA-Sec and align work with 
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the ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 Systems Engineering Processes [2]. Chapter III section III 
further describes this tailored approach and provides an illustrative graphic in Figure 1, 
reproduced here.  Sections IV-VI demonstrate this approach for STPA-Sec providing 
examples of each step in a thorough KC-X case study.   
 
 
5. How executable is STPA-Sec for USAF warfighting Systems? 
This question is answered in Chapter IV through the case study of a next 
generation aerial refueling platform, KC-X.  Sections IV-VI detail each phase and step of 
STPA-Sec as applied to the KC-X case study.  Section VII provides an assessment of 
FIGURE 1 TAILORED STPA-SEC OVERVIEW. 
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STPA-Sec’s utility specifically in Table XII and its narrative. While certain steps are 
identified as challenging, the results of the KC-X case study demonstrate STPA-Sec is 
scalable, readily executable, and useful for analysis of USAF warfighting systems.   
TABLE XII: STPA-SEC UTILITY ASSSESSMENT. 
 Systems Security Oriented STPA-Sec Phases 
 
Concept Analysis 
Architectural  
Analysis 
Design  
Analysis 
Purpose Determine Security 
Requirements 
Determine Design-To Criteria 
Determine 
Build-To 
Criteria 
Difficulty Easy Moderate Moderate-High 
Level of Domain Expertise Req’d Novice Advanced Expert 
Level of STPA Expertise Req’d Low High Moderate 
Amount of STPA instructional 
materials available 
Numerous Some Few 
Duration Hours Days Weeks 
Number of Steps 4 Steps 5 Steps 5 Steps 
 
6. What recommendations can be made to increase the utility and ease the use of STPA-
Sec? 
This question is answered throughout the details of the case study presented in 
chapter III.  The recommendations presented throughout this work attempt to describe 
and detail STPA-Sec to potential practitioners who are largely unfamiliar with the 
approach, offering tips and recommendations for its implementation. Recommendations 
and specific execution tips for the practitioner are presented in the description of the steps 
throughout the KC-X case study.  For example, Chapter IV Section V step four provides 
recommendations for determining the appropriate level of abstraction for control actions 
in a SoI.   
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Significance of Research 
With the increasing reliance on technology in warfighting systems, specifically 
complex aircraft, in conjunction with recent published vulnerabilities of cyber-physical 
systems [3], cybersecurity is of critical importance. The security problem is no longer 
limited to IT networks; as such, approaches developed for identifying computer network 
vulnerabilities have fallen short at securing complex cyber-physical systems against 
intelligent adversaries. Cybersecurity analysis approaches are needed to identify potential 
vulnerabilities and understand and define security requirements that can be designed to 
and formally verified.  Moreover, the next major armed conflict is likely to have a 
significant cyber component [4].   
The need for MWS built to operate in a highly contested cyberspace environment 
is understood at the highest levels of U. S. leadership with mandates and funding 
appropriated in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 Section 1647 [5].  
Within the U. S. Air Force, the Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS) 
office was specifically stood up to address these larger cyber concerns for both fielded 
and new weapons systems through the Air Force Cyber Campaign Plan (CCP).  This 
thesis directly contributes to the CROWS and CCP by assisting in the training of a cyber 
savvy acquisition force, LOA 3.  
Lastly, this work provides a widely distributable STPA-Sec case study specific to 
a USAF aircraft.  Perhaps more importantly, it provides a consolidated and distilled 
reference with recommendations to enable practitioners to execute conceptual systems 
security analysis.  
54 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Future research may continue to expand the detail provided for the KC-X case 
study.  This work used the case study as an example to support the detailed description of 
STPA-Sec, analysis of its utility, and to provide recommendations for the future 
practitioner. While the STPA-Sec analysis was largely informed and guided by its 
founder, Dr. William Young, and a few other knowledgeable practitioners, it provides a 
limited scope of detailed analysis.   
Additionally, while key stakeholder inputs should be already incorporated in the 
source documentation used for the case study, an ideal STPA-Sec is best executed 
through a working group session with the mission commanders and key SMEs. The 
absence of this working group does not invalidate the results and certainly does not 
detract from the case study’s illustrations of the STPA-Sec process, but it does leave 
opportunity for future work.  Specific to the KC-X example, the analysis in the 
architecture and design phases could be extended further by decomposing the key 
activities and control actions into lower, more detailed levels.  Additionally, further 
process model analysis could be completed along with more causal scenarios.   
The final recommendation for future research is working to integrate MBSE into 
the cybersecurity architectural analysis efforts.  This is an intended area for the UAF to 
address, but more research and examples will need to be completed to realize its utility 
for complex airborne warfighting systems. This research area is highly recommended for 
future students as it could combine the effectiveness of conceptual analysis methods, like 
STPA-Sec, with the benefits of integrated architecture and executable models.  
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